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REGULATION OF FRACKING IS NOT A TAKING OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Kevin J. Lynch ∗
Abstract

The oil and gas industry should lose most, if not
all, takings claims they might bring as a result of
regulation on fracking, even regulation that bans
fracking in specific communities or even statewide.
Many in government and in the oil and gas industry
think otherwise, and therefore when industry
threatens takings claims, the assumption is they
will win. These threats act to scare off government
officials from enacting protections demanded by
their constituents. This Article lays out the many
difficulties faced by those who would bring
fracking-takings claims in an attempt to show that
governments should not be deterred from enacting
regulations to protect against the worst harms of
fracking.
As the use of fracking has spread during the recent
oil and gas boom, inevitable conflicts have arisen
between industry and its neighbors, particularly as
fracking has moved into densely populated urban
and suburban areas. Concerned over the impacts
of fracking—such as risks to health and safety,
diminished property values, air and water
pollution, as well as noise, traffic, and other
annoyances—many people have demanded a
government response.
Government regulation of fracking has struggled to
catch up to the changes in industry, although, in
recent years, many state and local governments
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank those
who provided helpful feedback and comments on earlier drafts of this Article, particularly Jan Laitos,
Rachael Rawlins, K.K. DuVivier, Justin Pidot, Ed Ziegler, Nancy Leong, Margaret Kwoka, Sam Kamin,
Ian Farrell, Tom Romero, Alan Chen, César García Hernández, Zygmunt Plater, Sarah Schindler, Gina
Warren, John Echeverria, and Beto Juárez. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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have taken steps to reduce the impacts of fracking
in their communities or to ban the practice
outright. This article focuses on government
restrictions in New York and Colorado, two of the
key battlegrounds in the fight over fracking. New
York recently prohibited fracking across the entire
state after several towns had enacted their own
bans. In Colorado, the people have used the ballot
initiative process to enact restrictions on fracking
directly in a handful of local communities, and a
few statewide measures are expected to be on the
ballot this Fall.
The industry has responded, not only with public
relations spending to improve fracking’s damaged
reputation, but also with legal challenges to these
efforts to rein in oil and gas development. In
addition to suing local governments, often arguing
they do not have authority to regulate fracking, the
industry threatens to bring costly takings claims for
compensation due to alleged economic harms.
This Article examines the numerous legal and
factual issues that should make it difficult for the
industry to succeed on fracking-takings claims.
First, regulation of fracking, even including
outright bans, almost always can be defended as
necessary to prevent a nuisance or other
background principle of law that justifies
government regulation. Second, even if a nuisance
defense could be overcome, industry would have
difficulty proving that regulation has destroyed all
economic value in their property, and are thus
unlikely to be able to take advantage of the
categorical takings rule. When fracking-takings
claims are considered under the default balancing
test, takings are unlikely to be found except in rare
outlier cases.
Finally, because requiring
governments to pay compensation in frackingtakings cases would risk creating a windfall for
industry at the expense of the public, particularly if
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the oil and gas eventually is extracted, courts
should resist the temptation to rule against
government restrictions to protect public health,
safety, and the environment. Fracking-takings
claims should therefore only succeed in rare
circumstances where the regulation of fracking is
patently unreasonable or unnecessary, and
therefore government officials and policymakers
should not be dissuaded from regulating fracking
based on threats of takings liability.
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II. Regulation of Fracking ...................................................................... 42
A. Background on Fracking......................................................... 42
B. The Continuum of Fracking Regulation ................................. 46
1. New York Case Study ................................................. 47
2. Colorado Case Study................................................... 49
III. Takings Law..................................................................................... 52
A. Development of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence............... 53
1. The Rise of Regulatory Takings ................................. 54
a. The Default – the Balancing Test of Penn
Central ................................................................ 55
b. The Categorical Rule – Lucas “Total Takings” .... 58
2. Background Principles – a Defense to Takings
Claims ....................................................................... 60
3. The Denominator Problem .......................................... 63
4. Temporary Limitations on Property ............................ 66
B. Takings in the Oil and Gas Industry ....................................... 69
C. State- Specific Takings Law ................................................... 76
1. New York Takings Law .............................................. 76
2. Colorado Takings Law ................................................ 77
IV. Does Regulation of Fracking Cause a Taking of Private
Property?...................................................................................... 79
A. Fracking and Background Principles ...................................... 79
B. Defining the Scope of the Property Right for a Total Take .... 85
C. Regulation of Fracking under the Penn Central Factors ......... 89
D. Temporary Restrictions on Fracking: The Case of
Moratoria................................................................................ 91
E. Valuation of Any Takings Found ............................................ 92
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 96

2016]

FRACKING/TAKINGS

41

I. INTRODUCTION
The oil and gas industry has been booming across the United States
for several years now, primarily due to widespread use of high volume
hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Modern fracking depends on new
directional and horizontal drilling techniques to produce oil and gas
reserves that previously were unrecoverable. The industry aggressively
has been exploiting this newfound oil and gas supply, leading to record
profits. However, a growing body of public health literature supports
what many communities in oil country already know: modern fracking
techniques create serious impacts to public health, public safety, and the
environment, particularly when industry seeks to extract oil and gas
from densely populated urban and suburban areas.
In response to the encroachment of fracking operations—which
places large-scale industrial operations in the middle of residential,
commercial, or other sensitive areas—many local communities have
decided to protect their quality of life, as well as their health, safety, and
property rights, from the impacts of fracking. The range of available
government responses to fracking includes zoning restrictions to
preserve the character and safety of residential neighborhoods,
regulations to prevent some of the worst impacts of fracking, outright
bans on fracking at the state and local level, or a time-out (moratorium)
to allow time for further study or to develop an appropriate regulatory
response.
The oil and gas industry has gone all out to defeat or limit any
restrictions on the extraction of oil and gas through fracking. Almost
any local restriction immediately is challenged as preempted by state
law, with mixed success. Industry also threatens, before restrictions are
enacted, to file takings claims that will bring dire consequences
following any government regulation that reduces the economic value of
oil and gas interests. These threats undoubtedly have discouraged some
communities from enacting restrictions that otherwise would have been
adopted.
However, takings claims based on government restrictions on
fracking, referred to here as “fracking-takings,” are not a straightforward
matter. Despite a popular misconception, the Takings Clause of the
U.S. Constitution does not require compensation for any government
action that reduces the value of private property. Rather, takings
jurisprudence recognizes that government has an important role to play
in balancing the interests of private property against the interests of the
public as a whole. Because fracking is just one completion method that
can be used to produce oil and gas, and particularly because modern
fracking techniques create great risks to the health, safety, and
environment of neighboring communities, fracking-takings are not
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likely to succeed. Furthermore, any fracking-takings cases which
require payment of just compensation would risk creating a windfall
profit for the oil and gas industry or inappropriately limiting necessary
government regulation.
This Article examines many difficulties facing fracking-takings
claimants.
Although takings law is notoriously confusing and
indeterminate, fracking-takings claims are not likely to prevail. Rather,
only in rare and limited circumstances should fracking-takings claims
succeed. Part II of this Article lays out the recent developments in
technology and economic conditions that have led to the fracking boom,
the growing understanding of the impacts that fracking has on
surrounding communities, and the regulatory response taken by state
and local governments in New York and Colorado. Part III examines
the law of regulatory takings in general as well as the limited takings
cases in the oil and gas industry, including state-specific takings cases
that bear on the key issues likely to arise in fracking-takings cases. Part
IV then explains, for each stage of the takings analysis, why mineral
owners or oil and gas companies will have a difficult time prevailing on
a fracking-takings claim. Ultimately, despite the unpredictable nature of
takings claims in new substantive areas, fracking-takings cases appear
unlikely to succeed, and many policy reasons suggest caution is
warranted to avoid creating windfall profits for the oil and gas industry.
II. REGULATION OF FRACKING
A. Background on Fracking
Much of the oil and gas being produced today in the United States
using fracking could not have been produced even a decade ago. 1 The
combination of horizontal and directional drilling technology, the use of
enormous volumes of water for hydraulic fracturing, and the high price
for oil and natural gas 2 has made it economical to produce oil and gas
from tight formations such as shale. This tremendous reserve of oil and
gas was known previously but assumed to have little to no value because
there was no way to extract it at a reasonable cost that would allow for a
profit. That changed in recent years and led to incredible growth in the
1. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory Takings in the Shale Gas Patch, 19 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 193, 193-94 (2011) (discussing the development of technology that has enabled production of
natural gas reserves in shale which was previously uneconomic to produce).
2. Fracking in the United States is very expensive and it relies on high prices for oil and gas for
the investment to make business sense. If oil prices are above $100/barrel, then the industry can make a
large profit even off of very expensive wells. However, at lower prices such as exist currently, the
ability to profitably produce oil and gas through fracking is called into question. See discussion infra
Part IV.D.
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oil and gas industry in many parts of the U.S., including New York and
Colorado. 3
Fracking is one completion technique, a single part of the process of
developing a well, and yet it is the key technology that has created such
conflict when it comes into new communities. Completion is the
process that occurs after a well bore has been drilled, but before the well
begins producing oil and gas. 4 The well typically would produce oil and
gas regardless, even without fracking, but fracking normally is done to
increase the amount of oil and gas produced, which helps to offset the
tremendous cost of drilling long horizontal wells and the cost of the
fracking process. Fracking involves pumping large volumes of water,
along with sand and chemicals—often hazardous ones 5—down a well
bore, under pressure, with the intent of widening underground fissures to
allow more oil and gas to escape from the rock formation. 6 Fracking is
but one completion process; other processes commonly were used
historically, 7 and new processes are being developed that might obviate
the need to frack at all. 8
However, the boom of the oil and gas industry does not come without
costs. Initial fears about the impacts of fracking were focused on water
quality issues, both because the process of fracking is very disruptive to
3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Graeber, Low oil prices may hurt Colorado economy, UPI (Mar. 19, 2015,
6:32 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2015/03/19/Low-oil-prices-may-hurtColorado-economy/2631426758579/.
4. Well completion has been defined as “the activities and methods of preparing a well for the
production of oil and gas or for other purposes, such as injection; the method by which one or more flow
paths for hydrocarbons are established between the reservoir and the surface.” U. OF TEX. CONTINUING
EDUC., PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., A DICTIONARY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 229 (1st ed.
2005).
5. See Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health Perspective, THE
ENDOCRINE
DISRUPTION
EXCHANGE,
http://www.endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/GasManuscriptPreprintforweb12-5-11.pdf
(last visited May 18, 2016).
6. Hydraulic fracturing is defined as “an operation in which a specially blended liquid is
pumped down a well and into formation under pressure high enough to cause the formation to crack
open, forming passages through which oil can flow into the wellbore. Sand grains, aluminum pellets,
glass beads, or similar materials are carried in suspension into the fractures. When the pressure is
released at the surface, the fractures partially close on the proppants, leaving channels for oil to flow
through to the well.” PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., supra note 4, at 127. Historically, oil and gas
development used vertical wells and limited, if any, fracking, thus the impacts at the surface and to
neighboring communities was dramatically less in the past.
7. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 32:1-24, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.) (discussing how wells in Colorado were producing
since the 1860s, long before fracking was developed).
8. For example, a process called “underbalanced drilling” allows for production to occur based
on the pressure in the reservoir, rather than relying on fracking, in order to economically produce oil and
gas without many of the negative impacts associated with fracking. See, e.g., WEATHERFORD INT’L,
UNDERBALANCED DRILLING, http://www.weatherford.com/products-services/well-construction/securedrilling/underbalanced-drilling (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
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the rock formations where the oil and gas are found, and also because
fracking fluid contains many dangerous and toxic chemicals. 9 If those
chemicals reach drinking water supplies, it can be impossible to remove
the contamination. In some places tap water could even be lit on fire
due to natural gas that had migrated into the water supply. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) currently is working on a
study of the potential threats to drinking water from fracking and has
released a draft of that report. 10 In addition to water, other concerns
about fracking quickly became apparent, such as concerns over air
pollution caused by fracking and associated activities. 11 Additionally,
fracking has been linked to serious adverse health consequences, 12 as
well as to reductions in neighboring property values. 13
Fracking operations are essentially large scale industrial operations
with all the concomitant noise, light, traffic, air pollution, and impacts to
water and wildlife habitat that any large industrial operation would have.
The difference with fracking is that the operations go where the oil and
gas are found, which often is right beneath neighborhoods, schools, and
parks. Rather than people coming to the nuisance, this is a case where
the nuisance comes to the people. This situation has created inevitable
conflicts as the annoyance 14 of having fracking operations next door is
9. See Colborn et al., supra note 5. (“Some of these chemicals include benzene, a known
carcinogen, and methylene chloride which is highly toxic to humans.”)
10. EPA, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND
GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT (June 2015). Despite much
publicity of the statement that EPA “did not find evidence that [fracking] mechanisms have led to
widespread, systematic impacts on drinking water resources in the United States,” the report did still
recognize the threats that fracking poses to drinking water such a using up scarce water supplies, spills
of fracking fluids or produced water, fracking directly into underground water resources, migration of
fluids and gases underground, and inadequate wastewater management. Id. at ES-6. EPA confirmed a
number of instances where fracking had impacted drinking water supplies during both routine activities
as well as accidents. Id. at ES-23.
11. See, e.g., Rachael Rawlins, Planning for Fracking on the Barnett Shale: Urban Air
Pollution, Improving Health Based Regulation, and the Role of Local Governments, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
307 (2013).
12. See, e.g., Colborn et al., supra note 5 (discussing known health effects of chemicals used in
natural gas production); Lisa M. McKenzie et al., Human Health Risk Assessment of Air Emissions from
Development of Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, 424 SCI. TOTAL ENVIRON. 79, 82-83 (2012)
(finding residents living with a half mile of wells to be at greater risk of cancer and other health effects).
For a more comprehensive listing of peer-reviewed papers on the topic, see THE ENDOCRINE
DISRUPTION EXCHANGE, Chemicals in Natural Gas Operations: Peer-Reviewed Papers,
http://endocrinedisruption.org/chemicals-in-natural-gas-operations/peer-reviewed-articles (last visited
Mar. 10, 2015).
13. Ron Throupe et al., A Review of Hydro “Fracking” and Its Potential Effects on Real Estate,
21 J. OF REAL ESTATE LIT. 205, 227 (2013) (finding an expected decrease of 5-15% on home values in
robust real estate markets, and up to 25% decrease in weaker markets).
14. Annoyance may be too mild a term, as neighbors to fracking operations often report
unbearable noise, light, or vibration as well as toxic fumes which cause headaches, nosebleeds, and
more serious health impacts.
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combined with our growing but still incomplete knowledge of the public
health impacts associated with fracking operations. As a result, many
people who have fracking disrupting their lives have demanded that
their governments—both state and local—do something to protect them
from this harm. Where governments refuse or are too slow to respond,
citizens take matters into their own hands through their ability to enact
regulations or prohibitions at the ballot box.
In response, industry 15 has raised several challenges against these
restrictions on what they see as their absolute right to extract oil and gas,
regardless of the consequences. As an initial matter, once it recognized
the public relations issue on its hands, industry began spending a small
portion of its newfound wealth to try to assure the public that fracking
was safe and there was no reason to be concerned. Then, when local
governments enacted regulations, industry argued that local
governments do not have authority to regulate the industry due to state
preemption. The ultimate argument presented by industry is that if
government wants to regulate, or especially prohibit, fracking, then it
will have to pay for “taking” its property. In response to these
arguments, governments typically have responded by under-regulating
the industry in the eyes of their constituents. Citizens have in some
instances skirted their elected representatives by voting for additional
regulation at the ballot box. 16
This last point is rather remarkable in light of the history and
development of the oil and gas industry. The mineral rights now
asserted to be so valuable previously had little to no value. Only the
technological advances and high prices for oil and gas made these
resources so desirable. Thus, mineral interest owners who bring
fracking-takings claims may experience a large windfall if they are able
to extract these previously worthless resources. 17 Yet they threaten
15. The term “industry” is used broadly in this Article to include oil and gas companies, mineral
rights owners, industry associations or trade groups, and others who support, lobby, and generally argue
against regulations or restrictions that may be placed on fracking.
16. Fort Collins, Colorado, provides a good example of this phenomenon. Although the city
council had initially put its own moratorium on fracking in place, it later exempted the only operator,
Prospect Energy, from that moratorium. When the citizens of Fort Collins proposed to reinstate the full
moratorium at the ballot box, the city council adopted a resolution urging the defeat of the measure, in
part due to concerns over the cost of litigation that the city would face from industry. See Fort Collins
City Council, Meeting Minutes, Oct. 1, 2013 at 314-18.
17. Of course, windfalls might occur in other contexts as well, and the presence of a windfall
would not necessarily bar all takings claims. However, the presence of a windfall should be relevant to
a court that is determining whether the government is “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong v. U.S., 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The problem is particularly pronounced in the fracking context due both to the large
relative amount of the windfall/potential takings claim as well as the potential harm to the public in
terms of serious health consequences and possibly even deaths. A court that would impose a multimillion dollar fracking-takings judgment against a local government would thereby be elevating
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takings claims if they are denied the ability to capture this windfall.
Such a windfall is harmful because it imposes potentially crippling costs
on the public simply to reward a private property owner for having done
nothing. 18 Alternatively, the threat of takings liability (either before or
after resolution by the courts) might lead governments simply not to
regulate, thus allowing industry to impose negative externalities on the
public in terms of pollution, noise, traffic, and general disturbance of the
peace of formerly quiet residential neighborhoods. Thus, regardless of
the current state of takings law and how it might apply to frackingtakings, it would be bad public policy if the courts were to hold that
governments must reimburse mineral owners for this windfall in order to
protect the public from the risks and harms of fracking.
B. The Continuum of Fracking Regulation
In response to the explosive growth of fracking and the encroachment
of oil and gas operators on residential areas, many state and local
governments, or their citizens, have shown interest in regulating or
prohibiting fracking outright. The first approach that can be taken is a
moratorium—a time-out on development to allow the government to
study the risks and benefits and develop an appropriate regulatory
response. The next step might be issuing zoning regulations that restrict
the areas in which fracking can occur. Local governments potentially
could regulate the technical process of fracking, limiting the types and
amounts of chemicals used or regulating the pressure used to force the
water into the formation. Oftentimes, however, this type of regulation
will fall to the state level as local regulations may be preempted in some
states. Ultimately, some communities or even entire states may decide
that the risks of fracking are too great, and it should be prohibited
outright. These options encompass the range of fracking regulation that
currently exists today.

windfall profits over protection of public health, particularly since many governments might respond by
simply removing the regulation and allowing the harm to occur. Such a result would not support notions
of “fairness and justice” which underlie takings jurisprudence. This is obviously a complicated topic
which bears further research and study, but it should at least be noted at this time as a potential argument
against a fracking-takings claim.
18. Perhaps a company which invested significant resources in developing fracking technology
to exploit new oil and gas reserves might be able to claim they deserve the opportunity to profit from
their investment and innovation. However that is not the typical claimant in a hypothetical frackingtakings case. Those claimants instead likely have invested very little, if any, money or time in making
their formerly valueless resource become profitable to extract.
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1. New York Case Study
New York perhaps has gone farther than any other state to protect its
citizens and its environment from the unknown risks and the known
impacts of fracking. Initially, the state adopted a moratorium in order to
conduct further study to see if fracking could be done safely. ThenGovernor David Patterson put this moratorium in place in 2010 while
directing that state agencies such as the Department of Environmental
Conservation
complete its review of the public comments, make such
revisions to the Draft SGEIS that are necessary to
analyze comprehensively the environmental impacts
associated with high-volume hydraulic fracturing
combined with horizontal drilling, ensure that such
impacts are appropriately avoided or mitigated
consistent with the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA), other provisions of the Environmental
Conservation Law and other laws, and ensure that
adequate regulatory measures are identified to protect
public health and the environment. 19
Because of the complicated nature of this issue, it took four additional
years to complete the state’s analysis. In late 2014, the current
Governor Andrew Cuomo made the moratorium into a permanent ban,
relying on the advice from the Department of Environmental
Conservation and the Department of Health.
The review compiled by the New York Department of Health was
quite thorough and broad, and it sets out ample reasons why the state
should not rush ahead with allowing fracking when the impacts, both
short and long term, are unknown. 20 The study noted air impacts that
could affect respiratory health, climate change impacts, drinking water
impacts, soil and water contamination from spills, surface-water
contamination from waste treatment, induced earthquakes, and
19. Exec. Order No. 41, issued Dec. 13, 2010 (Requiring Further Environmental Review of
High-Volume
Hydraulic
Fracturing
in
the
Marcellus
Shale),
https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/Ib2187f04646111e09f330000845b8d3e?viewType=FullText
&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default).
20. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT (2014). The study concluded that “the overall weight of
the evidence from the cumulative body of information . . . demonstrates that there are significant
uncertainties about the kinds of adverse health outcomes that may be associated with [fracking], the
likelihood of the occurrence of adverse health outcomes, and the effectiveness of some mitigation
measures in reducing or preventing environmental impacts which could adversely affect public health.
Until the science proves provides sufficient information to determine the level of risk to public health
from [fracking] to all New Yorkers and whether the risks can be adequately managed, DOH
recommends that [fracking] should not proceed” in New York. Id. at 2.
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community impacts associated with boom-town economics. 21 While
recognizing the importance of further study to reduce uncertainty, the
study concluded that fracking has resulted in environmental impacts that
threaten public health, justifying a ban on fracking statewide. 22 As a
result, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation has
stated its intent to ban fracking in New York. 23
In addition to the statewide measure prohibiting fracking, many local
jurisdictions in New York also have taken steps to prohibit fracking
through their zoning authority. Most notably, the Town of Dryden was
one of the first local governments in New York to prohibit fracking. In
August 2011, the Town Board of Dryden voted to amend the local
zoning ordinance expressly to prohibit extraction of oil and gas or other
associated processes. 24 The Town Board declared that natural gas
exploration “poses a significant threat to [Dryden’s] residents’ health,
safety, and general welfare.” 25
The local ban in Dryden was challenged by industry as being
preempted by state law. However, the courts in New York upheld the
authority of towns such as Dryden to use their zoning authority to
prohibit certain land uses, such as fracking, from their jurisdictions.
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that state law did not
prohibit local zoning laws which prohibit oil and gas development,
based on the plain language, statutory scheme, and legislative history of
the New York Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Law. 26 The ultimate
resolution of the case was based on “the relationship between the State
and its local government subdivisions.” 27 Although the state could have
preempted local regulation of oil and gas operations, there was not
sufficient evidence to show “a clear expression of preemptive intent.” 28
Thus, the current law in New York is that the state has prohibited
fracking for an indefinite duration. Even if this statewide ban eventually
is modified or removed, local governments have the authority to prohibit

21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Cons., New York State Department of Health
Completes
Review
of
High-volume
Hydraulic
Fracturing
(Dec.
17,
2014),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/100055.html (stating that DEC Commissioner Joe Martens will implement
the recommendation to ban fracking in New York).
24. TOWN OF DRYDEN, ZONING LAW, art. V, § 502 (2012). See also Dryden Town Board, Res.
No 126 (2011), Resolution in Support of Adopting Amendments to the Town of Dryden Zoning
Ordinance Clarifying the Town’s Prohibition of Natural Gas Exploration and Extraction (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://dryden.ny.us/Board_Meeting_Minutes/TB/2011/TB2011-08-02.pdf.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201 (N.Y. 2014).
27. Id. at 1203.
28. Id.
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fracking themselves, and several jurisdictions already have done so. 29
2. Colorado Case Study
Colorado has experienced tremendous population growth since
previous oil and gas booms. Thus, a small portion of the oil and gas that
now are recoverable through the use of fracking lie beneath land that is
much more heavily populated than before. 30 The conflicts in Colorado
between industry and the public largely have occurred in suburban areas
along the Front Range, 31 where many people have moved for the quality
of life to be found in quiet residential communities. That quality of life
increasingly has been threatened as the oil and gas industry has
encroached upon those communities, proposing massive wellsites right
in the middle of many residential neighborhoods as well as near parks
and schools. 32 This has led to demands that all levels of government
take action to prevent harm and protect communities from fracking.
Several state agencies have responsibility for regulating the oil and
gas industry. Historically, primary responsibility for regulation of the
industry at the state level was in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (COGCC), part of the Department of Natural Resources.
The COGCC derives its authority from the Oil and Gas Conservation
Act, which has been amended several times in recent years to require
that oil and gas development be “consistent with protection of public
health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and
wildlife resources.” 33 In spite of this statutory mandate to protect the
public and the environment, the COGCC never has denied an
application for a permit to drill based on environmental concerns. 34 The
COGCC also has not set any substantive limitations on when or how

29. The Story of Dryden: The Town That Fought Fracking (And Is Winning), EARTHJUSTICE,
www.earthjustice.org/features/the-story-of-dryden-the-town-that-fought-fracking-and-is-winning (last
visited July 25, 2015) (noting that more than 100 towns in New York have enacted local bans or
moratoria on gas drilling).
30. For example, Longmont only occupies 0.02% of the land area of Colorado but has a
population density of 3,294 people per square mile. Aff. of Mary Ellen Denomy ¶ 8, May 30, 2014,
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.).
31. The Front Range refers to the area where the majority of the population in Colorado lives, in
the urban corridor abutting the Rocky Mountains. See Understanding Colorado Regions, 9NEWS.COM,
http://archive.9news.com/weather/resources/region_guide/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2015).
32. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Kyle, Proposed wells near school draw ire of Timnath residents,
COLORADOAN (Dec. 10, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2014/12/09/proposedwells-draw-fear-timnath-residents/20163783/.
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2014).
34. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 146:25-148:4, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.) (head of engineering for state agency could not recall a
permit to drill ever being denied).

50

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

industry may frack wells. 35 Instead, the regulations only require limited
notice to neighboring landowners and the state before fracking begins
and disclosure of some of the chemicals that are used in the fracking
process. 36 In response to pressure from the public, the COGCC also has
moderately increased setbacks for all wells whether the wells use
fracking or other methods. 37
Unhappy with the severe impacts that fracking still can have on
communities under state regulations, many citizens have pushed their
local governments to take further steps to protect them. In response to
citizen pressure, the City of Longmont enacted a series of land use
regulations applicable to oil and gas operators and secured the
agreement of industry to comply with those. 38 Unsatisfied that these
regulations still would allow fracking to occur in their community, many
residents of Longmont successfully organized a campaign to amend the
city charter to prohibit fracking entirely. 39 This ban on fracking was
challenged in state court on preemption grounds. 40

35. Some COGCC regulations do relate to technical matters such as well casing, but those apply
to all wells broadly, and not wells that will be fracked, specifically. See, e.g., COGCC Rule 207, 308B,
317, 318A, 341, 523, 703, 802, 804. The only regulations which apply specifically to fracking simply
require completion of a chemical disclosure registry form (including exemptions for “trade secrets”) and
a requirement for providing 48 hours of advance notice before fracking is conducted. COGCC Rule
205A, 316C.
36. See Colo. Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm’n, Rule 205A(b)(2) (requiring disclosure of chemicals
after fracking occurs on a well); Rule 316C (requiring 48 hours advance notice be provided before
fracking). No other state regulations specifically apply to fracking operations although some general
requirements would apply to fracking, such as Rule 805.c related to fugitive dust from oil and gas
operations. Rule 805.c.
37. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Rule 604.a(1) (2014) (setting the default setback to
be 500 feet from any “building unit”). The previous setback was only 150 feet. The regulations do
allow for waivers of this minimum requirement, and the state has not even been enforcing the
requirement. SIERRA CLUB, REVIEW OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY AND THE COGCC’S COMPLIANCE
WITH COLORADO’S SETBACK RULES 2 (2015), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/student-law-officeclinical-programs/ELC-Form-2a-Executive-Summary.pdf (noting that 181 permit applications since
August 1, 2013, out of a total of 1,300 application, lacked critical information necessary to ensure
compliance with setbacks and other requirements).
38. CITY OF LONGMONT, Ordinance O-2012-25 (2012). This ordinance amended the city code.
See, e.g., LONGMONT MUNICIPAL CODE, §§ 15.04.020.B.32 (laying out zoning requirements for oil and
gas operations and facilities under the Land Development Code). Those regulations included greater
setbacks than state law required (350 feet), a ban on oil and gas development in residentially zoned
areas, and other requirements to minimize noise and visual impacts of fracking operations. See id.
Although the state and industry sued to block these regulations, arguing they were preempted by state
law, both parties agreed to drop their suit and, therefore, the regulations in Longmont can be enforced to
any future oil and gas development. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. City of Longmont, No
2012CV702 (Boulder Cty. Colo.), dismissed by stipulation and without prejudice (Oct. 15, 2014).
39. Longmont City Charter, Article XVI (the “Longmont Public Health, Safety and Wellness
Act” cites to the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado constitution as justification for a
prohibition on hydraulic fracturing within the city).
40. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, No. 2014CA1759 (Colo. Ct. App.).
Briefing on this appeal was completed on April 2015. In an unusual development, the Court of Appeals
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Following the actions taken by Longmont and its citizens, other
jurisdictions began to take action against fracking as well. In November
2013, citizens of Fort Collins, Broomfield, Boulder, and Lafayette all
voted to place limitations on fracking. 41 Some of these measures also
have been challenged in court by the oil and gas industry, with the Fort
Collins case challenging a five-year moratorium having proceeded all
the way up to the Colorado Supreme Court. 42
As this Article was undergoing final edits, the Colorado Supreme
Court decided both the Longmont and Fort Collins cases, striking down
the fracking ban and moratorium that had been enacted locally in those
communities, respectively, on preemption grounds. 43 The Court did not
close the door on all moratoria related to oil and gas, leaving open the
possibility that a moratorium of shorter duration might not be
preempted. 44 And the Court rejected claims of implied preemption,
meaning that some regulation on fracking might still be permissible
even at the local level. 45 The state might also decide to enact a ban, or
to change the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to allow local bans,
although this would require a significant change in politics.
Additionally, Colorado voters are expected to consider statewide ballot

asked the Colorado Supreme Court to take up this case, and the companion case out of Fort Collins,
before the Court of Appeals ruled. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed to hear the cases, and
ultimately issued its decisions in May 2016. For procedural background, see City of Longmont v.
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo. 2016). See also City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil,
369 P.3d 586, 590 (Colo. 2016).
41. Fort Collins and Broomfield voters both approved temporary moratoria on oil and gas
development, and the City of Boulder extended its moratorium to allow time for further study of the
impacts of fracking and for the local government to develop an appropriate response. See Ballot Issue
2A Election Results, DENVER POST, http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/ballot-issue/2013/fortcollins_city__ballot-issue-2a/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2015); Broomfield Five Year Fracking Suspension,
Question
300
(November
2013),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Broomfield_Five_Year_Fracking_Suspension,_Question_300_(November_2013)
(last visited Dec. 2, 2015). Lafayette voters approved a “Community Bill of Rights” provision to amend
the city charter, which was designed to prohibit the extraction of oil and gas in the city and to affirm the
rights of natural people over corporations. City of Lafayette “Community Rights Act” Fracking Ban
Amendment,
Question
300
(November
2013),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Lafayette_%22Community_Rights_Act%22_Fracking_Ban_Amendmen
t,_Question_300_(November_2013) (last visited Dec. 2, 2015); see also Community Rights,
COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.celdf.org/section.php?id=423 (last visited
Mar. 10, 2015).
42. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, No. 2014CA1991 (Colo. Ct. App.).
Briefing on this appeal was completed April, 2015. Just as in the Longmont case, this case was
transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court after briefing was completed. City of Fort Collins v. Colo.
Oil, 369 P.3d 586, 590 (Colo. 2016).
43. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); City of Fort
Collins v. Colo. Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016).
44. City of Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 594 (“We express no view as to the propriety of a
moratorium of materially shorter duration.”).
45. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 583-84.
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measures in November 2016, one that would restore local control over
oil and gas operations and another that would increase minimum setback
requirements, 46 which could give rise to similar threats of takings
liability. Regardless, these preemption decisions from the Colorado
Supreme Court will not end the debate over the necessity of further
regulations on fracking at the state or local level. As long as the
industry seeks to drill and frack near homes, schools, parks, and other
sensitive communities, members of the public will demand greater
protections from local and state officials. Therefore, the analysis in this
Article should remain helpful for future decision-making, even if the
specific Colorado laws which are analyzed have been found to be
preempted by state law.
III. TAKINGS LAW
Takings jurisprudence in the United States is notoriously complex
and inconsistent 47 with the hallmark of the development of the law being
dramatic swings by the Supreme Court from one end of the spectrum to
the other. As a result, the application of takings law to new situations is
relatively difficult to predict. Private interests can find helpful language
in Supreme Court opinions which support their position that government
regulation has gone too far and amounted to a de facto condemnation of
their property. Government and public interests can find equally helpful
language in those same opinions to support their position that reasonable
regulation, such as theirs, is well within the scope of their authority and
no compensation is required.
However, in some situations (such as the oil and gas context) the
specter of astronomical takings judgments against states or local
governments can be used by private interests to intimidate them,
dissuading enactment of regulations demanded by the public. However,
despite the scare tactic of potential takings claims and the uncertainty as
to how courts will apply takings law to new situations, a few general
46. CREED, Initiatives, http://resistextremeenergy.org/initiatives/ (last visited May 25, 2016);
see also Joshua Zaffos, Colorado activists set their sights on ballot measure to limit drilling, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.3/the-fractured-terrain-of-oil-and-gasopposition/colorado-activists-set-their-sights-on-a-ballot-measure-to-limit-drilling.
47. The confusing state of the law has been described as a “crazy quilt pattern of Supreme Court
doctrine.” Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63; see also Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel,
25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 353 (2003) (noting that “the complexities and arcane nuances of takings cases
sometimes overwhelm us”); Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations:
Applying the Lucas Categorical Taking Rule to Severed Mineral Property Interests, 11 VT. J. OF ENVTL.
L. 525, 544-45 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of defining the scope of property for takings analysis
and describing caselaw as “regulatory takings pronouncements promise[] to drown the student and the
most accomplished advocate in confusing and conflicting verbiage”).
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conclusions can be drawn. These conclusions indicate that private
interests asserting takings claims in the fracking context face an uphill
battle with several potentially difficult issues of proof. Governments at
the state and local level, if they determine takings claims to be a risk,
can take steps to prepare a strong defense against those takings claims.
For example, New York’s study of fracking and its potential impacts48
will go a long way towards either establishing that a background
principle or the nuisance defense precludes a taking, or that no taking
under the Penn Central factors 49 is appropriate. Other governments
wishing to insulate themselves from liability can conduct their own
similar studies or cite to existing literature on the impacts and threats of
fracking.
In order to set the stage for applying takings law to the fracking
context, three key background topics will be introduced. First, a brief
history of the development of takings jurisprudence in the Supreme
Court will shed light on those uphill battles and the defenses available to
governments. Second, takings claims in the oil and gas context,
although limited (perhaps due to a history of under-regulation of the
industry), also will provide some context for how takings claims may
play out in the fracking context. Finally, the takings law of our two
case-study jurisdictions, New York and Colorado, also will be examined
to explore the key issues created by the federal takings framework.
A. Development of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
Takings law historically applied first to the physical appropriation of
property, specifically real property. Thus, early takings claims based on
government regulation of property were framed as de facto physical
takings without just compensation. 50 The Supreme Court, however, did
not take the bait and rejected the analogy to eminent domain cases,
holding that exercise of the police power to restrict the use of private
property “is very different from taking property for public use.” 51 Thus,
regulatory takings (as commonly understood) were squarely rejected in
the nineteenth century: “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public

48. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 5-8 (2014).
49. See discussion infra Part III(A)(1)(a).
50. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887).
51. Id. at 669.
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benefit.” 52 Only in the twentieth century did the Supreme Court change
course and hold that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.” 53 Thus, the concept of “regulatory takings” was born.
1. The Rise of Regulatory Takings
The development of regulatory takings jurisprudence has charted an
erratic course as the Supreme Court has attempted to create workable
standards that could be applied to regulatory takings claims. The Court
developed a balancing test to weigh relevant factors but also attempted
to streamline the process by injecting some categorical rules. All of the
regulatory takings tests, however, are centered around the same goal.
“Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent
to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private
property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of
these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that
government imposes upon private property rights.” 54
However, for the purposes of this Article, the history is not as
important as the result. As takings law currently stands, the pendulum
has swung back towards the balancing test. Thus, this Article briefly
will explore the dominant balancing test that courts have been instructed
to apply in most instances. However, the categorical rule regarding
“total takings” also will be presented, because fracking-takings plaintiffs
inevitably will seek to shoehorn their case under this test rather than
give full consideration to the entirety of circumstances, including the
police power justifications for a particular regulation.
52. Id. at 668-69.
53. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). An alternate approach, laid out by
numerous previous courts, would not have been to say that compensation is due if regulation goes too
far, but rather to test whether the regulation in question falls outside of the government’s police power.
“If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or
the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
constitution.” Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661. Rather than leaving the issue largely to the legislative branches
to sort out, the Supreme Court chose to dive headlong into the regulatory takings concept, creating a
complicated, confusing, and indeterminate system placing real and significant limits on the ability of all
levels of government to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of their communities. Id.
54. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). The Supreme Court also
discussed a third category of regulatory takings which are not relevant here, a category which includes
both permanent physical invasions as well as the exactions cases. Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994), Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). Perhaps the exactions cases might come up in the future
if the government action being challenged was not state or local bans on fracking but instead
government land use approval that imposed limitations on fracking as an exaction or condition of
approval. However, prohibiting the use of fracking as part of approving local land uses would not be
very analogous to the situation in Nollan and Dolan, which the Court compared to appropriation of an
easement over the relevant property.
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a. The Default – the Balancing Test of Penn Central
The hallmark of modern regulatory takings law is that each case
involves “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” based on the “particular
circumstances” of each case rather than any “set formula” for
determining if a taking has occurred. 55 The factors to be considered
were laid out most prominently by Justice Brennan in the Penn Central
case. 56 The non-exclusive 57 list of factors to be considered includes (1)
the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations;
and (3) the character of the government action. 58 However, ultimately,
the factors are to be used by courts to determine “when ‘justice and
fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.” 59 The ultimate conclusion in most
takings cases “necessarily requires a weighing of the private and public
interests.” 60 Regulatory takings cases thus are not susceptible to simple
analyses, but involve detailed factual findings that can inform the
court’s balancing of the relevant interests. 61
In order to determine the economic impact of the regulation on the
property, courts must first determine the proper scope of the property
right in a particular case. 62 Courts look not simply to the absolute
economic impact of the regulation, but rather to how much economic
value remains in the property after the regulation is applied. Because
55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The ad hoc nature of
the inquiry recently has been reiterated by the Supreme Court, when it stated “no magic formula enables
a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking” and
noted the “few invariable rules” that have been recognized in takings law. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012). Regulatory takings are quite distinct from condemnations
and physical takings, which typically involve application of per se rules. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v.
Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002). Instead, regulatory takings jurisprudence “is
characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ . . . designed to allow ‘careful examination of all
the relevant circumstances.’” Id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104; Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606
(2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
56. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
57. Although Justice Brennan notes only that these are “several factors that have particular
significance,” id., in practice these are typically the only factors discussed by courts. However, the
factors are sufficiently broad-reaching that the factors are not overly restrictive.
58. Id. at 124.
59. Id. (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
60. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
61. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17 (“When the government condemns or physically
appropriates the property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however, the
owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that
they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and
the analysis is more complex.”).
62. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987).
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the economic impact depends on the value of the underlying property,
takings claimants have an incentive to define the property interest
narrowly, while government has the opposite incentive. This tension
inevitably has led to what is described as the “denominator problem.”63
However, in general, courts instruct that the “parcel as a whole” is the
relevant scope of the inquiry. 64
Under the “parcel as a whole” standard, courts have rejected attempts
by private property owners to define their property rights narrowly. The
“parcel as a whole rule has three basic dimensions: horizontal, vertical,
and temporal.” 65 Thus, courts have refused to consider air rights
separately (for development purposes), 66 temporary restrictions on
development rights, 67 restrictions only on commercial uses of eagle
feathers, 68 and restrictions on only a portion of property, such as setback
requirements. 69 Under this standard, “where an owner possesses a full
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle
is not a taking.” 70 Although the Supreme Court for a time questioned
the legitimacy of the “parcel as a whole” requirement, 71 it has been
reaffirmed. 72
In determining the economic impact of the regulation, courts look not
just to the diminution in value compared to the parcel as a whole, but
also to the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations. This second factor in the Penn Central
analysis has several key components. First, the timing of when the
regulation was enacted in relation to when the property interest was

63. The denominator problem is examined more fully infra Part II.A.3.
64. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); Animas
Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 69 (Colo. 2001). This Article focuses on the
separation of property into less than a fee simple estate, and does not examine the case of breaking
property into portions which are developed at separate times, because presumably regulations or bans on
fracking apply the entire property owned, even if that property is just the mineral estate. Courts have
recently taken a more narrow view of what constitutes the “parcel as a whole” when development occurs
in pieces over time. See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
65. Daniel L. Siegal, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to
Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603, 604 (2012). “Horizontal refers to the land surface
(‘metes and bounds’); vertical to air space and subsurface rights; and temporal to past and future uses of
the land.” Id. For a different take on the parcel as a whole, from a proponent of greater protection of
private property under the Takings Clause, see Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of
Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549 (2012).
66. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130.
67. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
68. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
69. See generally Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
70. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66.
71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
72. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
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acquired is relevant, though not dispositive, in determining the
reasonableness of the property owner’s expectations. 73
Second,
investment-backed expectations must be reasonably probable rather than
speculative—not “starry eyed hope of winning the jackpot if the law
changes.” 74 Third, courts look to whether the owner was operating in a
“highly regulated industry.” 75 Fourth, courts examine whether there was
notice of the problem that spawned the need for the regulation. 76 Fifth,
courts assess whether the owner might have “reasonably anticipated” the
regulation in light of the “regulatory environment” at the time of
purchase. 77 Finally, the expectations of others on whether the regulation
will be followed are also relevant in determining the impact on
investment-backed expectations. 78
The last Penn Central factor deals with the character of the
government action. As the Court explained in Penn Central, takings
“may more readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by the government . . . than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” 79 If the
regulation in question was designed to promote public health, safety,
and welfare, regardless of whether it prevents a nuisance, the character
of the government action weighs against finding a taking. 80 Another
aspect of this factor is the purposes served and the effects produced by
the regulation—thus courts must look not just at the economic impact of
73. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2012) (O’Connor, J., concurring). T he Supreme Court
has rejected postenactment purchase as a categorical defense against a taking, holding that the
government “may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.” Id. at 627. Justice
O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the
claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those [distinct investmentbacked] expectations.” Id. at 633.
74. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010). The court
acknowledged that property owners might pay “a slight speculative premium” based on the theory that
the regulatory restriction might someday end, but that such speculation does not qualify as a protected
“expectation.” Id.
75. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The court
explained that a party in a highly regulated environment “necessarily understands that it can expect the
regulatory regime to impose some restraints on its” property, the right to mine coal, in this case. Id.
76. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that there
was no suggestion the claimant “was unaware that surface mining was a potentially environmentally
hazardous activity”).
77. Id. (discussing the ability of the claimant to reasonably anticipate the possibility of an
adverse administrative finding which would limit its right to mine coal).
78. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1122 (noting the investment-backed expectations of tenants who
reasonably expect rent control regulations to remain in place). This factor has also been described as the
“average reciprocity of advantage” secured by a regulatory scheme, which serves to justify restrictions
on property. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
80. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the regulation but also at the public purpose such as the avoidance of
impending harm absent regulation. 81 Scholars have noted that the
character of the government action factor is consistent with, but not
identical to, the nuisance background principles defense. 82
b. The Categorical Rule – Lucas “Total Takings”
The primary categorical rule of relevance to this Article is the per se
taking rule based on deprivation of “all economically viable use of
property” announced in the Lucas case. Takings law contains very few
per se rules, 83 but the “total taking” rule is the most prominent. As a
result, if a claimant can show that he has been denied all economically
beneficial use of his property, then there is no need to assess the full set
of circumstances surrounding the case using the Penn Central factors.
In effect, this categorical rule cuts out the “character of the government
action” factor and puts primary emphasis on the “economic impact
factor.”
The “interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations” factor is not explicitly considered, although one could
argue that the “background principles” defense subsumes most, if not
all, of that factor.
As with most categorical rules, the total takings rule is simple to state
but often complicated to apply. 84 Under the Lucas framework, courts
are required to “simply” determine what the relevant property interest is
and then determine whether any economically beneficial use remains the
property. As discussed more fully below, this makes the determination
81. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). On remand, the
court in Rhode Island emphasized the many public harms justified by the wetlands regulations at issue
and even found that construction in the area would damage public trust interests and constitute a
nuisance, effectively overcoming the relatively minor economic impact. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 920 (4th ed. 2010).
82. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 525, 571 (2009).
83. “Quite simply, there are very few per se rules in regulatory takings cases.” Lost Tree Vill.
Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412, 430 n.28 (2011), rev’d on other grounds, 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed.
Cir. 2013).
84. Of course, as pointed out by the dissent in Lucas, the trial court’s finding that the relevant
property was valueless was absurd. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1033, 1044 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Instead, almost inevitably any property subject to regulation will have some
remaining value. The Supreme Court has held that $200,000 of residual value was enough to mean the
property was not left “economically idle,” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631, but it has not provided any clear
guidance on how much value is enough. This problem is magnified in the oil and gas context, where the
“value” of the relevant property interest depends on many factors, most notably the cost of production
and the price obtained for the oil and gas. Because these factors can shift dramatically in very short time
periods due to changes in technology, operational efficiency, global supply and demand, or even
international relations, relying on the economic viability of producing oil and gas, with or without a
particular technique such as fracking, is especially problematic. Profits of $10 million today could
easily turn to only $500,000 or even a net loss tomorrow.
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of the proper scope of the property right to be determinative of the
outcome. 85 However, the test is not so simple as to end there, for the
Lucas court recognized that “background principles” such as nuisance
law might provide a defense to these categorical total takes.86
Therefore, courts must go beyond assessing the economic impact to also
analyze
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s
proposed activities . . ., the social value of the claimant’s
activities and their suitability to the locality in question .
. ., and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can
be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and
the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike. 87
This defense has come to be known as the “background principles”
defense based on language from Lucas describing these as “background
principles of nuisance and property law.” 88 Subsequent court decisions
and scholars have noted that this analysis applies not just in total takings
cases but can operate as a defense even in the default Penn Central
balancing cases. 89
Lucas is an interesting and unusual case for several reasons. First, as
explained by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion, a regulation will
deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial use of property
in only “extraordinary circumstances.” 90 Second, the finding of a total
take was highly questionable and ignored the remaining value in the
property that did not involve development of single-family residences,
such as use for recreation or camping. 91 Third, the state actually had
85. This issue, the “denominator problem,” is discussed infra Part III.A.3. This test is highly
subject to manipulation by prospective litigants as well as to indeterminate outcomes from courts.
86. “Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial
use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.” Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1027.
87. Id. at 1030-31 (internal citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1030.
89. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Coalition for
Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004); Michael C. Blumm &
Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325-26 (2005) (citing those and other cases).
90. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. The majority only recognizes the “extraordinary” nature of this
finding once in its opinion. However, the dissent from Justice Blackmun emphasizes this point as well
in arguing that the majority was making a dramatic change in takings law in order to address a very rare
circumstance, using the memorable phrase “[t]oday the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.” Id. at
1036. Future development of takings law has confirmed that only rarely can plaintiffs demonstrate a
total taking has occurred. See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 322.
91. The trial court’s finding that the property had lost all economic value was not reviewed by
the appellate courts in South Carolina or the Supreme Court, which instead based its decision on the
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amended the relevant law in a way that might have allowed for a special
use permit for the sought-after development. This highlighted the fact
that the law can, and often does, change, thus calling into question the
possibility for regulation ever to entirely take all value of a property. 92
Despite these unusual aspects of the case, the Supreme Court
nevertheless proceeded to announce what was seen at the time as a
dramatic alteration of existing takings law, inserting a categorical rule to
replace the default balancing test of Penn Central.
2. Background Principles – a Defense to Takings Claims
The Lucas case recast many earlier takings decisions 93 and focused
future cases on weighing, as an initial matter, whether the proposed use
of property would be permissible under “background principles” of
property or nuisance law. Although the Lucas case itself focused
primarily on nuisance law, 94 subsequent cases have identified numerous
other background principles which may apply.
The Lucas case examined in some detail what it would take for a
government to invoke nuisance as a “background principles” defense.
First, the Supreme Court made clear that background principles provide

assumption that finding was correct. However, Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent that the
conclusion “is almost certainly erroneous” because the owner retained important property rights such as
the right to exclude others, the right to alienate the land for its remaining value, or the right to use the
land to “picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a moveable trailer.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1044.
92. Id. at 1011-12. In effect, the court was deciding a “temporary takings” case, although the
Supreme Court later clarified its position on temporary takings in the Tahoe-Sierra case, where it upheld
a moratorium against development lasting 32 months against a takings challenge, finding that
compensation was not required under those circumstances. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002).
93. For example, the Mugler case was distinguished as being a “generally applicable criminal
prohibition on the manufacturing of alcoholic beverages” rather than “a regulation specifically directed
to land use.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 n.14 (emphasis added). Several other cases, such as Nollan,
Agins, and Euclid, were converted from cases prohibiting “harmful or noxious use” to cases affirming
that regulation is not a taking if it “substantially advances legitimate state interests.” Lucas, 505 U.S.
1023-24. Ultimately, the Court distinguished earlier cases which could readily be interpreted to support
a broader police power defense to takings claims because they did not involve allegations that “the
regulation wholly eliminated the value of claimant’s land.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 (citing Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
For example, the Goldblatt case was re-characterized as one where “other uses [were] permitted”,
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 n.13, even though the Goldblatt decision repeatedly points out that the
regulation “completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been devoted,”
and that the claimant argued that the regulation “would confiscate the entire mining utility of their
property.” Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 596 (1962). No taking was found in
that case even though “the use prohibited [was] arguably not a common-law nuisance.” Id. at 593. The
Lucas court similarly reimagined the decisions from Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) and
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1048.
94. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32.
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an affirmative defense, and thus the burden is on the government agency
to prove that the use would be prohibited under the background
principles. 95 Second, the Lucas court emphasized that the government
must do more than rely on legislative findings that the use of property
would be against the public interest, 96 thus rejecting broad assertions of
immunity based on the police power. Third, background principles must
have existed for some time and cannot have been “newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation).” 97 Finally, the Lucas court cited some
broadly-applicable issues to be resolved in answering this question,
relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather than the specific
nuisance law in South Carolina. 98
The nuisance exception has been applied as a defense in many cases
after the Lucas decision was announced. 99 Colorado applied the
nuisance background principle defense to deny a takings claim where
the proposed action would have spread radioactive contamination,
basing its ruling on common law principles. 100 Other states have relied
on public nuisance statutes. For example, government installation of
groundwater monitoring wells was found to be immune to a takings
challenge because the contamination of groundwater constituted a public
nuisance under the California code. 101 Florida found that compensation
was not required where a city mandated closure of a hotel that had
become inextricably entwined with drug and nuisance activity. 102
Ultimately, the nuisance defense will depend on the particulars of
state nuisance law. But the Restatement (Second) of Torts does provide
some helpful guidelines. A nuisance may be either public or private. 103
Public nuisance is based on interference with a right common to the
public, such as public health, public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort, or the public convenience. 104 Private nuisance is based on an

95. Id. at 1031 (“South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property
law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently
found.”); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 326.
96. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
97. Id. at 1029. This part of the Lucas decision was not joined by Justice Kennedy, who
explained in his concurrence that “[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society. The state should not be
prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must
consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.” Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1030-31.
99. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 335.
100. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994).
101. Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (1997).
102. Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 876 (Fla. 2001).
103. Restatement (Second) of Torts: Nuisance § 821A (1979).
104. Id. § 821B. Courts also will examine a variety of factors such as the gravity of the harm, the
utility of the conduct, and whether the invasion was intentional. Id. §§ 825, 827, 828.
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invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land,
which includes the right to freedom from discomfort and annoyance
while using the land. 105 The harm must be more than slight
inconvenience or petty annoyance, but, rather, a significant harm. 106
Lucas did not limit the background principles defense to nuisance, but
instead opened the door for a range of other legal doctrines to work as
affirmative defenses to takings claims. Scholars have noted the success
of background principles defenses 107 based on the public trust doctrine,
the natural use doctrine, 108 the federal navigational servitude, 109
customary rights—particularly of indigenous people’s rights, 110 water
rights restrictions, 111 the wildlife trust, 112 and treaty rights of Native
Americans. 113 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has recognized
another background principle that may provide a defense to takings
claims—the environmental rights amendment embodied in the state
constitution. 114
Citizens in Colorado have cited to their own
constitution, which protects inalienable rights to protect their lives,
liberties, and property, as justification for passing local bans or
moratoria on fracking. 115 The application of these and other background
principles to the fracking context will be discussed in Part III.A.
The effect that the Lucas decision on takings law has been to create
an initial opportunity for the government to raise a defense based on
background principles. If the government is able to prove that a
background principle could impose the same limit as the regulation, then
no compensation is required. Only once the court has moved past this
“logically antecedent inquiry” 116 can the takings claimant seek recovery
based on the “total taking” per se rule.

105. Id. § 821D cmt. b.
106. Id. § 821F cmt. c.
107. For a comprehensive discussion of these defenses, see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at
341-54.
108. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
109. See, e.g., United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790, 795 (3d Cir 1996).
110. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (custom of beach access
prevented taking); Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw.
1995) (native Hawaiian gathering rights).
111. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 350-52.
112. John D. Echeverria & Julia Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 376-81 (2003).
113. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 354.
114. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 946-50 (Pa. 2013).
115. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3.
116. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
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3. The Denominator Problem
Once any background principles defense to a takings claim has been
resolved, courts must next determine the scope of the property right
against which the regulation’s impact is to be measured. This analysis
presents the denominator problem. The denominator problem will
feature prominently in any litigation over takings in the fracking context
because even bans on fracking outright cannot be said to deprive all
value of the property unless the property is divided at least down to a
severed mineral interest.
The denominator problem has been identified since the inception of
regulatory takings jurisprudence. In his dissent in Mahon, Justice
Brandeis argued that “If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in
place by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all the
parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with
the value of the whole property.” 117 Justice Brandeis specifically
cautioned against attempts by property owners to increase their rights by
“dividing the interests in his property into subsurface and soil.”118
Despite these objections, the majority in Mahon found a taking based on
the reasoning that “to make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it.” 119
Numerous scholars also have addressed the denominator problem.
Professor Sax highlighted the issue in an important article attempting to
create a consistent theory for takings cases. 120 Professor Sax lamented
the “unworkable problem of definition” inherent in the diminution in
value test and the “terrible complexities” of trying to identify the
property at issue in a takings case. 121 Professor Michelman further
elaborated on the issue and coined the name by which it is now known
when he explained that the “question is raised of how to define the
‘particular thing’ whose value is to furnish the denominator of the
fraction.” 122 Professor Michelman then went on to raise the rhetorical
question:
Suppose I am forbidden to remove gravel from my land
. . . Inasmuch as mining rights are well recognized,
divisible interests in land, . . . why not say that any land

117. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
120. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-67 (1964).
121. Id. at 60.
122. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967) (emphasis added).
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consists of two ‘things’—mining rights and surface
rights, . . . and that the relevant denominator in testing a
regulation which impinges only on mining rights . . . is
the value of those rights—which the regulation totally
destroys? 123
Professor Michelman questions any reliance on divided interests in
land, such as severed mineral interests. 124 Of course other scholars,
particularly those who advocate for a stronger property rights stance,
argue that dividing up the property is appropriate in the takings
analysis. 125
The denominator problem also was famously discussed in Lucas
itself. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas briefly touches on the
denominator problem when it notes the “inconsistent pronouncements
by the Court” in similar cases such as Mahon and Keystone. 126 Justice
Blackmun’s dissent goes into more detail regarding the issue, pointing
out that the issue “cannot be determined objectively.” 127 Justice
Blackmun cites Professor Michelman on the topic: “We have long
understood that any land-use regulation can be characterized as the
‘total’ deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement . . . Alternatively, the
same regulation can always be characterized as a mere ‘partial’
withdrawal from full, unencumbered ownership of the landholding
affected by the regulation.” 128 Justice Stevens’ dissent goes even
further, calling out the “arbitrariness of such a rule” and noting that
courts can read property rights broadly, while developers and investors
can sell “specialized estates to take advantage of the Court’s new

123. Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 1230 (“Holmes intimated strongly [in Mahon] that the separation in ownership of the
mining rights from the balance of the fee, prior to enactment of the restriction, was critically important
to the petitioner’s victory. But why should this be so? We can see that if one owns the mining rights
only, but not the residual fee, then a regulation forbidding mining totally devalues the owner’s stake in
‘that’ land. But is there any reason why it should matter whether one owns, in addition to mining rights,
residuary rights in the same parcel (which may be added to the denominator so as probably to reduce the
fraction of value destroyed below what is necessary for compensability) or residuary rights in some
other parcel (which will not be added to the denominator)?”).
125. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
126. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). The Lucas majority
suggested that the “answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations
have been shaped by the State’s law of property” but avoided the issue in that case because the property
interest was an interest in land. Id. Under the majority’s speculation, the scope of property interest
might be based on “whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition and
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a
diminution in (or elimination of) value.” Id.
127. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1988); see also Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Michelman, supra).
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rule.” 129
Both the majority and Justice Blackmun’s dissent pointed to the
divergent outcomes in Mahon and Keystone as examples of the
indeterminate nature of this inquiry. 130 Although similar in many
respects, the decision in Keystone was careful to analyze whether a
taking had occurred not based on an analogy to the Mahon case, but
rather on the “particular facts” of the case. 131 The similarities between
the effect of the regulation, which required that some coal not be mined
in order to prevent subsidence, created “obvious and necessary reasons
for distinguishing” Mahon. 132
The key distinguishing factors
highlighted by Justice Stevens were (1) that the “character of the
governmental action involved here leans heavily against a finding of a
taking[,]” because the regulation was created to prevent “what it
perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare;” 133 and (2)
there was no evidence to show that the regulation “makes it impossible
for petitioners to profitably engage in their business.” 134 The second of
those distinguishing factors is relevant for the denominator problem.
The parties in the case below sought to avoid the “complex and
voluminous proofs” that would be required to demonstrate the actual
impact that the law would have on the coal company, and so the
Keystone Court simply rejected a facial challenge to the law. 135 Thus,
the key difference between Mahon and Keystone was that in the earlier
case, the Court had found that the mining of “certain coal” was
commercially impracticable, while in the latter case there was no
evidence of any actual harm to the claimant. 136 Yet, the Court did
implicitly touch on the denominator problem when it faulted the coal
company for failing to introduce evidence “that the Act makes it
commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their
129. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course, some of those specialized
estates already existed, such as severed mineral interests. Combined with the proliferation of local and
state regulations or bans on fracking, the severed mineral estate has the potential to create the perfect
storm of manipulation that Justice Stevens anticipated. Professor Patrick McGinley has noted that
recognition of smaller and smaller severed mineral interests “provides the opportunity to ‘game’ the
system to allow manipulation of less than fee simple estates in land to facilitate takings claims.”
McGinley, supra note 47, at 577.
130. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, 1054.
131. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).
132. Id. at 484.
133. Id. at 485. This finding alone is enough to distinguish the cases, and so Mahon can be seen
not as a case about diminution of property value, specifically the entirety of mining rights for certain
coal, but rather as a case where the de facto appropriation of property was not done for a “public
purpose.” Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (eminent domain could not be used
when land was not taken for “public use”).
134. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
135. Id. at 493.
136. Id.
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bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania” or identifying “a
single mine that can no longer be mined for profit.” 137 This discussion
implies that the Court was taking a broad view of what property interest
must be used for the denominator.
Ultimately, the denominator problem is still an issue that plagues
federal takings law. 138 State law may shed some light into how the
problem is to be resolved in particular states. 139 However, the Supreme
Court has looked beyond state property law to define the relevant
property interest more broadly. 140 A few courts have identified some
helpful factors for deciding the appropriate scope of the property
interest. 141 Yet the issue is particularly problematic for the fracking
context, where mineral rights, including rights to oil and gas, often are
severed from surface rights in land. Fracking-takings thus present an
interesting application of takings law to a new context, and one with
incredibly high stakes not just for mineral owners, but also for local
governments and neighboring residents who would be affected by
fracking operations.
4. Temporary Limitations on Property
One final aspect of takings law is important to discuss, given that
several governments have taken the step of placing a moratorium on
fracking, rather than restricting it outright in a permanent ban. Thus, a
moratorium implicates not the geographic scope of property or the rights
137. Id. at 495-96.
138. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Federal Claims is the federal court that has most often dealt with
the issue. That court has held that a royalty interest in minerals is a compensable interest for Fifth
Amendment takings purposes, although it held off ruling whether a takings had occurred in that case.
Cane Tenn., Inc., v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 785, 792 (1999). However, in a later decision in that case
the court held that the denominator to be considered was the parcel as a whole, including uses of the
surface estate such as for timber. Cane Tenn., Inc., v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (2002). Even
when the property owner owns more than just the mineral estate, however, a taking might still be bound
if the regulation involves “the total destruction of all economically viable use.” See, e.g., Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991). One attorney from the Department of
Justice has noted that it remains an open question in the Federal Circuit whether the Lucas categorical
taking rule applies to a partial interest in property, such as a mineral estate, and has called for clear
resolution of this issue. See Kristine S. Tardiff, Closing the Last Lucas Loophole: The Partial Interest
Problem, in THE 12TH ANNUAL CLE CONF. ON LITIGATING REG. TAKINGS AND OTHER LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE & ENVTL. REG. (Vt. L. Sch. 2009).
139. State-specific takings law for New York and Colorado are discussed infra Part III.C.
140. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (refusing to
treat the support estate as a separate parcel even though state law recognized it as a distinct property
interest).
141. See, e.g., District Intown Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (identifying factors to include “the degree of continuity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to
which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the restricted lots benefit the
unregulated lot.”).
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to make particular use of property; rather, a moratorium implicates the
temporal dimension of the bundle of rights.
The leading and most recent case on takings based on a temporary
taking rejected finding a categorical per se taking, even if the regulation
deprives the property owner of all economic use of property, instead
affirming the need to apply the balancing test embodied in Penn
Central. 142 Thus, in the Tahoe-Sierra case, the Supreme Court rejected
arguments that the categorical rule from Lucas should be extended to
temporary takings. 143 Instead of extending the categorical rule, the
Court said that the answer to the question of whether a moratorium on
development constitutes a taking “is neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no,
never’; the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the
case.” 144 In support of this determination, the Court explained that the
“parcel as a whole” standard from Penn Central meant that destruction
of one strand in the bundle of rights is not a taking. 145 Thus in this case,
the Supreme Court found it to be error that the district court had
“disaggregated petitioners’ property rights into temporal segments
corresponding to the regulations at issue and then analyzed whether
petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during each
period.” 146 Instead, the Court affirmed that the “parcel as a whole” rule
applies and that the denominator problem could not be resolved through
the “circular” reasoning of defining the property interest affected by the
regulation in terms of what portion of the property was affected by the
regulation. 147
On the other hand, the temporary nature of the restriction could not
act as a shield. 148 An additional justification for rejecting a categorical
take rule for moratoria was the “interest in facilitating informed
decisionmaking by regulatory agencies[,]” which would be undermined
if officials were forced to rush through the planning process for fear of
takings liability. 149 Ultimately, the Court found that a 32 month
moratorium did not amount to a taking, rejecting calls to set a

142. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-21 (2002).
Because the finding of the lower courts based on Penn Central was not challenged, the Court was able
to dispose the case simply by declaring that Penn Central provided the appropriate test for this case. Id.
at 321 n.16. Notably, this case was argued by the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John
Roberts, as the attorney for the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. Id. at 305.
143. Id. at 321.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 327.
146. Id. at 331.
147. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331.
148. Id. at 337.
149. Id. at 339.
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presumptive limit for the duration that is allowed. 150
The question still remains: under what circumstances does a
moratorium or other temporary limitation amount to a taking? The
answer courts have developed is whether the limitation amounts to an
“extraordinary delay” in governmental decisionmaking. 151 However an
“extraordinary delay” typically must last for a long time, and courts
have rejected temporary takings claims where the delay took seven to
eight years. 152 Some factors that courts look to in determining if an
“extraordinary delay” has occurred include bad faith by the government,
the nature of the permitting process, and the reasons for any delay. 153
Thus it is now settled law that a moratorium is neither always nor
never a taking and must instead be analyzed using the Penn Central
factors. In those cases where the balancing test leads to a conclusion
that a taking has occurred, the court still must determine the appropriate
remedy for the takings claim. The remedy question was squarely
presented in the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Los Angeles case, where the Court reviewed a ruling from the
California Supreme Court that monetary compensation was not due for
the temporary take that occurs from the time a restriction is enacted until
the time that it is enjoined as a taking without just compensation. 154 In
that case, the Court rejected the idea that claims for a taking are limited
to nonmonetary relief, instead holding that landowners are entitled to
bring an action in inverse condemnation under the Takings Clause. 155
The Court was clear that it was not passing on the issue of whether a
temporary take had occurred, 156 however, on remand, the California
courts determined that no take had in fact occurred, and so no
compensation was due. 157
If a temporary restriction on property is found to be a taking, the
question still remains of how to put a value on the compensation
required. The First English Court hinted that the value may be based on
“the value of the use of the land during this period,” but did not

150. Id. at 341-42 (“[W]e could not possibly conclude that every delay of over one year is
constitutionally unacceptable,” especially where the district court found 32 months to be reasonable.).
151. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
152. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 472 U.S. 172 (1985) (delay of
eight years); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (delay of seven years).
153. Bass Enter. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Tabb
Lakes, 10 F.3d at 799; quoting Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098).
154. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S 304, 311 (1987).
155. Id. at 315.
156. Id. at 313.
157. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 329 (2002)
(citing First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989)).
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explicitly say how the compensation should be valued in that case.158
Yet the Court was equally clear that it was based on an allegation of
total denial of use of the property and did not intend to apply to “normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like.” 159 This case however assumed that the lease of
the land would be simply for use that would leave the land in the same
state as it was prior to the start of the lease. Fracking-takings,
particularly temporary takings, will raise entirely distinct issues of
valuation.
B. Takings in the Oil and Gas Industry
The law of takings in the oil and gas context is not nearly as well
developed as the law is in regards to other mineral interests such as coal,
gravel, or sand, nor as developed as takings law with respect to
restrictions on development of land for commercial or other economic
purposes. 160 The relatively few cases that have examined takings claims
in relation to oil and gas development are discussed in this Part, along
with analogous cases from other mineral takings cases. Additionally,
some of the unique background principles that apply to oil and gas are
worth considering, such as the “reasonable use” restrictions on the right
of severed mineral interest owners to occupy the surface in order to
extract minerals.
The key initial issue for takings of oil and gas is defining the scope of
property rights in oil and gas, or the mineral estate more broadly. In
New York, Colorado, and many other states, the right to extract minerals
from the subsurface can be and often has been severed from ownership
of the surface estate, thus creating a related but distinct mineral estate.
The severance of the mineral estate often was accomplished by deed
which transferred ownership of the surface while explicitly retaining the
mineral rights.
Even if severed, the mineral estate includes more than simply the
right to extract oil and gas through fracking. As an initial matter,
limitations on fracking do not prevent future extraction of minerals by
techniques that do not involve fracking. Bans on fracking do not
actually take the resource because the oil and gas remains under ground,

158. First English, 482 U.S. at 319.
159. Id. at 321.
160. One reason for the lack of development in the law in the oil and gas industry may be that
historically the industry has been significantly under-regulated. Only recently, as developments in
technology and concerns about the health, safety, and environmental impacts from fracking have
become better understood, have governments begun enacting strict regulations or even bans on the oil
and gas industry.
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to be extracted in the future if the ban is lifted or if new technologies are
developed. Additionally, in many areas oil and gas were produced
without the use of fracking. 161 Going even beyond the oil and gas
context, mineral rights include rights to mine coal, sand, gravel, and
other minerals as well. 162 In Colorado, for example, the Boulder-Weld
coalfield overlays, to a large extent, the Wattenberg field, the most
significant area of oil and gas development along the Front Range. To
the extent coal was previously extracted from this area, it might provide
another barrier to a fracking-takings claim based on the same mineral
estates.
A fee simple property interest in the mineral estate might not even be
the subject of a takings claim, as mineral rights often are leased. In such
a situation, a company which had entered an oil and gas lease has
brought a takings claim against Dallas. 163 Oil and gas leases add several
dimensions to a takings claim, particularly where a moratorium may
cause a lease to be extinguished before the moratorium ends. 164 Another
even smaller slice of the property interest in mineral rights is a royalty
interest. “[T]he owner of a mere royalty interest has no present or
prospective possessory interest in the land; . . . owns no part of the
minerals (as such) in place; . . . does not become a cotenant in the
mineral estate; . . . and [the royalty] interest is merely a present vested
incorporeal interest in the land.” 165 Similarly, rights to extract oil and
gas often are described as a profit à prendre, which is “a right to remove
a part of the substance of the land.” 166 Another potential complication is
that oil and gas historically were viewed as subject to the rule of capture,
although the Texas Supreme Court recently found that groundwater,
while subject to the rule of capture, still could be owned in place and
therefore potentially was subject to a takings claim. 167
161. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 32:1-24, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.).
162. Mineral rights include metals such as copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, silver, uranium, and
zinc, as well as gemstones such as diamonds. See Mineral Resources, COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://coloradogeologicalsurvey.org/mineral-resources/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015).
163. Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dallas, No. DC-14-1443, 2014 WL 631055 (Dallas Cty.,
Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014).
164. Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, 798 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (certifying questions to the N.Y.
Court of Appeals regarding whether oil and gas leases are extended due to state moratorium, accepted at
23 N.Y.3d 1047 (2014)).
165. Lee Jones, Jr., Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1948).
166. See, e.g., Atlantic Oil Co. v. Los Angeles Cty., 446 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Cal. 1986). A profit à
prendre “is an interest in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament.” Id. For a more
detailed discussion of the history of property rights in oil and gas minerals, see K.K. Duvivier, Sins of
the Father, 1 TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROP. L. 391, 393-409 (2014).
167. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 SW.3d 814 (Tex. 2012). Under the rule of capture,
neighboring landowners are not liable even if they pump so much groundwater that wells on
neighboring land dry up. The Texas Supreme Court compared groundwater to oil and gas extensively to
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A few states have decided takings claims based on limitations on the
ability to mine sand and gravel. These cases have generated mixed
results about one of the key issues in takings—the parcel as a whole.
Ohio, for example, has denied a takings claim where a county denied a
conditional-use permit to allow the owner to mine sand and gravel on
his property. 168 There was no taking even though the property was
purchased only to mine sand and gravel, because the court was required
to look to the “parcel as a whole” which included surface rights. 169
However, an earlier case had found a taking of coal rights, which was
deemed to be severable and had in fact been severed in that case. 170
Somewhat reconciling the two decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated, as dicta, that a “mineral estate may be considered the relevant
parcel for a compensable regulatory taking if the mineral estate was
purchased separately from the other interests in the real property.” 171
However, other states, such as Colorado, have rejected this view when
squarely confronted with the issue, holding instead that the mineral
estate must be considered along with the remainder of the bundle of
rights. 172 Separating out the mineral estate in this way would open up
the courts and our takings jurisprudence to the manipulation that Justice
Stevens predicted in Lucas 173 and should be rejected. 174
Thus far, there have been only a handful of cases involving an inverse
condemnation claim based on a prohibition of oil and gas drilling or
exploration.
The earliest of those cases, which found an
unconstitutional taking had occurred, has several key flaws. The Court
of Appeals of Michigan issued the decision in 1994, before the advent of
modern fracking techniques and our growing understanding of its

reach the conclusion that the rule of capture was not inconsistent with ownership of minerals in place.
Id. at 828-32. In Colorado at least, the rule of capture has been displaced by the statutory scheme of the
Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which was enacted in part to protect the correlative rights to a shared
common pool resource. COLO. REV. STAT. 34-60-102(1)(a)(III). Therefore, this Article does not wade
into the discussion of whether the rule of capture prevents a takings claim.
168. State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ohio
2007).
169. Id. at 67.
170. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1009 (Ohio 2002).
171. Shelly Materials, 875 N.E.2d at 67.
172. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of La Plata, 38 P.3d
59, 68 (Colo. 2001).
173. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Professor McGinley has examined takings of mineral rights in detail, noting the several
serious issues with extending the total taking rule to less than fee simple interest in land: “Because
severed mineral interests have all the characteristics of personal property to which the Lucas categorical
taking rule does not apply, the shrunken bundle of property rights inherent in severed coal property
interests similarly should disqualify such interests from the per se protection offered by the Lucas
categorical rule.” McGinley, supra note 47, at 577.
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impacts. 175 The primary deficiency in the court’s analysis was in its
resolution of the denominator problem. The court concluded that the
prohibition on drilling “completely deprived plaintiffs of all use of at
least some portion of their property holdings in the protected area.” 176
The court ignored that directional drilling would allow the production of
oil and gas beneath at least a portion of the protected area.177
Furthermore, the court swept aside as “immaterial” the fact that the
plaintiffs had extensive property holdings outside of the protected area
that were not affected. 178 And the court did not even address the larger
issue of whether the “parcel as a whole” could be appropriately
narrowed to the mineral interests. 179 Another problem with the decision
was the rejection of a nuisance defense by the government on the
grounds that the justification was not to prevent harm on adjoining
property, but rather to protect the surface owner’s property. 180
The final issue presented in the Michigan case was the valuation
question. Here, the appellate court found fault with the trial court’s
finding of over $71 million as the required just compensation for the
taking. 181 The court found that the fair market value of the property at
the time of the taking was not the appropriate measure of compensation.
Instead the compensation value should have been based on the “fair
market rental value of the property.” 182 However, because of the unique
interests in mineral rights, the calculation of the rental value of the
property was not simple. Ultimately, the court settled on providing
guidance that the value might be something near the “amount of money
they could have received in interest on [the] present value of the income
stream” and that could have been produced if the oil and gas were
extracted. 183 The court was careful to note the taking was only
temporary in nature, because if the prohibition on drilling was lifted in
the future, then the plaintiff could extract the resource and a full
compensation for taking would amount to a windfall. 184
Additionally, the Michigan Court of Appeals has backed off of the
175. Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
176. Id. at 220.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d at 221. This rejection of a nuisance defense was particularly
problematic because the surface property was owned by the federal government, and therefore any harm
to public lands would impact the public and not just a private landowner. Additionally, if
fracking/takings claimants argue that the mineral estate should be treated as a separate property interest,
then the surface estate should not be treated differently than neighboring properties.
181. Id. at 220.
182. Id. at 223.
183. Id. at 224.
184. Id. at 223.
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approach taken in the Miller Brothers case in a more recent takings case
related to restrictions on drilling for oil and gas. The court was asked to
consider takings claims related to the denial of permits to drill oil and
gas wells on private property located within a state forest subject to a
comprehensive management plan. 185 The court rejected a categorical
takings claim because of the remaining value in the land, such as
operation of wells in a limited development region or use of horizontal
wells, even if the other options would increase costs or not result in a
profit. 186 The court then applied the Penn Central factors and found that
no unconstitutional taking had occurred. 187 Thus, even in Michigan it
seems that a fracking-takings claim would face an uphill battle.
One prominent fracking-takings case is pending against the City of
Dallas in Texas state court, but the case is complicated by the fact that
the city leased the mineral rights before denying drilling permits to the
company. 188 A few other cases have raised, but not decided, the takings
issue. For example, a case in West Virginia included claims that denials
of permits to drill amount to a taking, however, the West Virginia
Supreme Court avoided deciding the takings question by holding that a
state statute prohibiting drilling in state parks could not be applied
retroactively where a deed conveying mineral interests beneath the state
parks preceded the statutory prohibition. 189 Similarly, in Pennsylvania,
a case was decided where an oil and gas company alleged takings claims
related to drilling in a state park, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided the case on other grounds. 190 This case did make several
passing references to takings law, although not necessary to the decision
of the case. 191 Additionally, in other mineral takings cases, the
185. Schmude Oil, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 856 N.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)
(per curiam).
186. Id. at 93.
187. Id. at 94.
188. Trinity East Energy, LLC v City of Dallas, No. DC-14-1443, 2014 WL 631055 (Dallas Cty.,
Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014) (trial was set for November 2, 2015, and summary judgment motions
were due in August 2015). Because the city leased the mineral rights, this case is not only a takings case
but also involves allegations of fraud and breach of contract. Samantha Blons, Dallas Takings Case
Could Affect Future Mineral Development on Municipal Land, KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON CTR. FOR
ENERGY, LAW & BUS. (Apr. 18, 2014), http://kbhenergycenter.utexas.edu/2014/04/18/dallas-takingscase-could-affect-future-mineral-development-on-municipal-land/.
189. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Huffman, 705 S.E.2d 806, 814 (W. Va. 2010).
190. Belden & Blake Corp. v. Dep’t of Conserv. & Nat. Res., 969 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. 2009) (this
case involved the imposition bonds, fees, and right-of-way requirements). The court decided the case on
the grounds that even though the state owned the surface land, it did not have authority to require more
than reasonable use of the surface when the oil and gas company was extracting the resources. Id. at
532-33.
191. The court did state that “a grant or reservation of minerals and the right to mine them
constitute property rights, which the law recognizes, and which may not be taken for public use without
compensation.” Id. (citing Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). The court did not
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that mineral rights are not
to be analyzed alone in all cases, but, rather, under a flexible approach
that considers all relevant factors, including reasonable investmentbacked expectations. 192
Although not a takings case, a court in Texas recently found that oil
and gas operations near the Parr family’s residence in Texas amounted
to a nuisance. In the case, which involved a lot of time and expensive
litigation, the jury found the oil and gas operator liable for $3 million in
damages for causing a private nuisance. 193 The same reasoning could be
used in other jurisdictions to defend regulations or prohibitions on
fracking from takings challenges. The key issue then becomes an
evidentiary issue in each particular case. The Parr case does at least
show, however, that fracking operations in the immediate vicinity of
residential areas has been found to be a nuisance. Although the
government would bear the burden of establishing that nuisance law
limits mineral interest owners’ right to extract their oil and gas, this case
shows that it is possible for governments to meet that burden, at least in
some instances. The large and growing body of scientific literature
documenting the risks associated with fracking would bolster these
claims and support arguments from governments that they need not wait
until their citizens are harmed to protect them from fracking. 194
Another background principle that might apply to fracking-takings is
the reasonable use restriction regarding the use of the surface to extract
subsurface minerals. 195 For example, “an aggrieved surface owner may
address any of the complexities for the denominator problem, nor did it discuss the Penn Central
balancing factors or Lucas categorical takings. Thus, not much can be predicted based on these passing
and conclusory comments that compensation would be required. As if the earlier statement were not
overly broad enough, the opinion concluded with the following statement: “a property owner’s interests
and rights cannot be lessened, nor their reasonable exercise impaired without just compensation, simply
because a governmental agency with a statutory mandate comes to own the surface.” Id. at 533. This
again is of course a borderline absurd misstatement of the law, which allows all kinds of lessening of
property rights without requiring compensation, so long as the property right is not deprived of all
economically beneficial use. Furthermore, the latter part of the conclusion perhaps provides the key to
understanding this decision – it was based not on a takings analysis but rather rested on the proposition
that a surface owner cannot condition the extraction of minerals, even when the surface owner is the
state. That reading of this case would not be as blatantly inconsistent with Keystone, Penn Central, and
numerous other takings precedents.
192. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (citing the test
laid out by the Federal Circuit in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
193. Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-1650-E (Dallas Cty. Tex. 2014). The case focused
on the toxic air emissions from the oil and gas operations and their effects on the neighboring Parr
family. Toxic air emissions are but one impact of fracking on neighbors and the public that might
amount to a nuisance.
194. See discussion at supra notes 9-13, and accompanying text.
195. The court in Miller Bros. did not address this, but instead only focused on nuisance as the
only possible background defense. Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Mich. Ct.
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bring a common law action in tort against an operator who has used the
surface in an unreasonable manner.” 196 “The right to use the surface as
is reasonably necessary, known as the rule of reasonable surface use,
does not include the right to destroy, interfere with or damage the
surface owner’s correlative rights to the surface.” 197 The right of
reasonable surface use “does not create an ownership interest in the
surface estate, or the right to destroy the surface, but merely a right of
access.” 198 Mineral interests may not be extracted in such a way that the
surface rights are destroyed, even if destruction of the surface is the only
practical means of extracting the minerals. 199
The central policy question raised by the background principles issue
asks when it is appropriate for government to proactively limit or
prohibit industrial activity that threatens the health, safety, and welfare
of the public. Must governments and their citizens wait for harm to
occur and then seek compensation from the oil and gas industry, as
happened in the Parr case? Or can governments take preemptive action
to protect their citizens by imposing limits on fracking, even if those
limitations have significant economic effects? Even if the harm already
has occurred, proving harm due to fracking and related activities still
can be costly, if not impossible, due to the latent nature of many of the
harms200 as well as complex issues of causation related to different
lifetime exposures to toxic chemicals. Thus, the only approach which
guarantees that the public health and welfare will not be harmed is
allowing government to regulate or even prohibit fracking where it
deems the risk to the public to be too great. This approach is on
especially sound footing when it is applied in densely populated urban
and suburban communities where industrial activity has been found to
be incompatible with competing land uses such as homes, schools, and
parks. Fracking has been proven to be a nuisance in some instances.

App. 1994).
196. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 926 (Colo. 1997). The court further
explained that “when a surface owner asserts a claim of trespass based on alleged excessive surface use,
the trier of fact must consider whether the operator’s use of the surface was reasonable and necessary.”
Id.
197. Id. (citing Colo. Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 245 P.2d 461, 464 (Colo. 1952).
198. Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995).
199. Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 535 (Colo. 1923). The court rejected claims that “the only
practicable way to mine this coal is to strip off the soil and gravel lying upon it; that it cannot be
practically mined by tunnel or shaft because there is no solid rock above it,” instead finding that the
right to “use” the surface cannot mean to destroy it. Id.
200. See Colborn et al., supra note 5. (“The damage may not be evident at the time of exposure
but can have unpredictable delayed, life-long effects on the individual and/or their offspring. Effects of
this nature would be much harder to identify than obvious impacts such as skin and eye irritation that
occur immediately upon contact. Health impairments could remain hidden for decades and span
generations.”)
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The impacts of fracking are becoming more and more clearly
understood by the scientific community, as they already are understood
by many residents where fracking takes place. The noise, pollution, and
annoyance that fracking inflicts upon its neighbors is more than
sufficient to prevent a fracking-takings claim where government has
acted to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.
C. State- Specific Takings Law
1. New York Takings Law
Although New York courts have not yet addressed takings claims in
connection with mineral rights, they have upheld a variety of laws
directed at protecting public interests through protection of the
environment. For example, the courts found no unconstitutional taking
based on requiring a conservation restriction in exchange for approval of
development. 201
Similarly, denial of variances from setback
requirements under tidal wetlands permitting was not an
unconstitutional taking. 202 Courts in New York typically apply the
familiar Penn Central test (a New York case, of course) to determine if
a taking has occurred, sometimes finding an unconstitutional taking but
often times not. 203
Regarding the critical issue of the scope of the property right to be
analyzed, New York courts adhere to the “parcel as a whole” rule.204
This rule has been applied in cases challenging regulations designed to
protect the environment, such as the wetlands regulations. 205 New York
courts also have rejected a takings claim when rezoning a property as
residential precluded the operation of a crushed-stone quarry on the
property because the property still retained some economic value. 206

201. Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (N.Y. 2004).
202. Gazza v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (N.Y. 2003).
203. See, e.g., Friedenburg v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451, 460 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003) (finding a taking, under Penn Central factors, where a wetlands regulation destroyed
“all but a bare residue of the economic value of the property.”).
204. See Putnam Cty. Nat. Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).
205. Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (N.Y. 1979) (property owner wished to extract
humus, sand, and stone from property subject to wetlands regulation); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v.
State, 479 N.Y.S.2d 983 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
206. Briarcliff Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 708 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424-25 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000).
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2. Colorado Takings Law
Colorado has not yet issued any takings decisions in the oil and gas
context. However, takings claims in other contexts, particularly those
involving mineral rights, as well as cases discussing background
principles of law, are useful in predicting the outcome of frackingtakings cases in Colorado. These cases briefly will be presented to
provide the final background necessary to analyze fracking-takings in
our two case study jurisdictions.
The first key issue is the scope of property rights that would be
analyzed in a fracking-takings case in Colorado. Like many other states,
Colorado does recognize a severed mineral estate. 207 However, when
squarely presented with the issue, the Colorado Supreme Court has held
that “the appropriate focus of a takings inquiry is the property rights as
an aggregate rather than merely the mineral rights.” 208 The same court
also held that the denominator for assessing the economic impact of a
regulation should be “the contiguous parcel of property owned by the
landowner, not merely the segment most severely affected.” 209 Earlier
Colorado cases once could have been read to support a narrower
reading, as they had recognized a taking of mineral rights, specifically
coal, due to a requirement to provide support for a highway on the
surface. 210 However, that case was decided before the Supreme Court
decision in Keystone which clarified that enforcing support requirements
for coal do not necessarily create a taking. 211 Furthermore, the question
of considering separate mineral rights was not squarely presented, as it
was in the more recent case discussed above. Therefore, the current
state of the law in Colorado is that courts are required to look at the full
bundle of rights in land as part of a single contiguous property.
One additional wrinkle to consider is that oil and gas have
traditionally been treated differently from coal. Specifically, Colorado
courts have applied nuisance as a background principle defense against
takings claims. Most prominently, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected
claims by the owner of a uranium-contaminated mill site alleging a total
regulatory taking of its property by the Colorado Department of Public
Health and Environment. 212 The court held that “a property owner
207. Russell Coal Co. v Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. 1954).
208. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of La Plata, 38
P.3d 59, 68 (Colo. 2001). The relevant mineral rights in this case which could be produced from the
land were sand and gravel. More broadly, the court stated that “it is inappropriate to limit a takings
inquiry solely to one particular right in the land, or, to a particular part of the land.” Id. at 61.
209. Id. at 68.
210. Russell Coal, 270 P.2d at 774.
211. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 (1987).
212. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1994). Notably, this case was
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[cannot] reasonably expect to put property to a use that constitutes a
nuisance, even if that is the only economically viable use for the
property.” 213 And the issue of whether a nuisance had occurred
expressly was held to be a “question of law” which could be resolved by
the appellate courts, 214 thus indicating that Colorado does not require a
great deal of evidence to “prove” that an activity would constitute a
nuisance. The basic principles of nuisance law relied on in Colorado are
that it applies to both activities and conditions, that a public nuisance is
“the doing or failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety,
health, or morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance,
inconvenience, or injury to the public,” and that uses of land that “cause
pollution constitute a nuisance” under Colorado common law. 215 The
application of these broad nuisance principles to fracking-takings will be
discussed more fully in Part III.A, infra.
Finally, the Colorado constitution protects “inalienable rights” of its
citizens. This protection creates another background principle defense
in fracking-takings cases in Colorado. The Bill of Rights to the
Colorado Constitution states that “[a]ll persons have certain natural,
essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their
safety and happiness.” 216 These rights were specifically cited in several
of the local ballot measures to place moratoria or bans on fracking in
local communities. 217 Although the Colorado Supreme Court declined
to reject a preemption claim in the Longmont case based on inalienable
rights, 218 the Court did not hold that inalienable rights have no meaning
in Colorado, and thus they might still provide a background principle
defense against a fracking-takings claim, even going beyond common
law nuisance principles.
One final aspect worth mentioning is that the takings clause in the
Colorado constitution is somewhat broader than the federal takings
clause, in that it protects against not just takings but also “damage” to
private property. 219 Thus, Colorado law protects “property owners who
defended for the state by two prominent conservative lawyers, Gail Norton who was then the Attorney
General (and later served as U.S. Secretary of the Interior) and Timothy Tymkovich, the State Solicitor
General, who currently sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
213. Id. at 1001.
214. Id. at 1002 n.7.
215. Id. at 1002.
216. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3.
217. See discussion at supra notes 38-41, and accompanying text.
218. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 585-86 (Colo. May 2, 2016).
219. “Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just
compensation.” COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added). Also worth noting is that the Colorado
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have been substantially damaged by public improvements made upon
land abutting their lands, but where no physical taking by the
government has occurred.” 220 However, outside of the situation where
government action to create some public improvement damages private
land, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the state takings
clause as consistent with the federal takings clause. 221 Thus, both state
and federal cases interpreting the Takings Clause would be relevant in
deciding a fracking-takings claim brought in Colorado.
IV. DOES REGULATION OF FRACKING CAUSE A TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY?
A. Fracking and Background Principles
Regardless of the bundle of rights held, a property owner does not
have the right to take one of the sticks from the bundle and poke it in his
neighbor’s eye. While the owners of oil and gas mineral interests may
sincerely believe that they have an absolute right to extract their
property, no court has ever recognized such an absolute right. Rather, as
courts have repeatedly emphasized, the definition of property and
property owners’ reasonable expectations include both the concept of
limitations on property through background principles of law and
property such as nuisance. The metaphor often used is that “a nuisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place – like a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard.” Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that
takings do not occur when circumstances change such that previously
lawful activity is deemed “injurious to the health, morals, or safety of
the community,” 222 or when the uses around the property preclude its
use in a certain manner, such as for a brickyard, 223 or when new
circumstances arise giving the public interest priority over a private
property interest, such as a disease spreading through trees. 224 Fracking,
constitution does not contain a public use requirement, however since one has been found in the federal
takings clause, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the difference is not material
here.
220. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 388 (Colo. 2001) (citing City of Pueblo v.
Strait, 36 P. 789, 791 (Colo. 1894). The “damage” in this case was to landowners adjacent to an aboveground electric power line. Other cases applied the “damage” clause where the government constructed
a viaduct next to plaintiff’s land, City of Pueblo, 36 P. 789, or made improvements to streets abutting
private property that caused harm, Troiano v. Colo. Dep’t of Highways, 463 P.2d 448, 449 (Colo. 1969);
Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 131 P. 409 (Colo. 1913).
221. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the County of La Plata, 38
P.3d 59, 64 (Colo. 2001).
222. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
223. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
224. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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particularly when conducted in heavily populated areas, implicates
many of these background principles.
New York has made a strong showing that fracking amounts to a
public nuisance at common law based on the report from the state
Department of Health.
The nuisance-like impacts of fracking
documented include air pollution, water pollution, induced earthquakes,
community impacts of boom town economics, and health impacts such
as increased cancer risk and premature births. 225 These impacts would
qualify as nuisance in New York as they are substantial harms that are
unreasonable in nature, particularly in relation to fracking near
residences and other highly populated areas. 226
Colorado nuisance law readily can be applied to fracking-takings
claims. In Colorado, a “public nuisance is the doing or failure to do
something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or morals of the
public or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to
the public.” 227 Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected a takings
claim based on nuisance background principles because “relevant
Colorado common law principles would not permit a landowner to
engage in activities that spread radioactive contamination.” 228 Colorado
statutory nuisance law also would apply to fracking-takings cases. The
Colorado Public Nuisance statute prohibits “[a]ny unlawful pollution or
contamination of any surface or subsurface waters in this state, or of the
air” as well as “the conduct of persons in or about that place [] such as to
annoy or disturb the peace of . . . the residents in the vicinity.” 229 Ample
evidence exists that fracking causes or may cause pollution of the air
and water, and many unwilling neighbors to fracking sites can testify to
how fracking “annoys or disturbs the peace” of their community. 230
225. N.Y.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 5-8 (2014).
226. Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E. 2d 968, 972 (N.Y. 1977).
A private nuisance under New York law threatens the use or enjoyment of land by one or relatively few
people, while a public nuisance includes actions which “endanger or injure the property, health, safety
or comfort of a considerable number of persons.” Id. at 971.
227. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994).
228. Id. The court went on to explain that the property owner’s expectation that he would be able
to use his property in a way that would spread contamination was “highly unreasonable.” Id.
229. COLO. REV. STAT. 16-13-304(1)(a) and 16-13-305(1)(e) (1995).
230. One cautionary note that might limit the availability of the background principles defense
based on nuisance is the hesitancy of courts to impose remedies such as injunctions to prevent an
anticipatory nuisance. For example, a decades-old Colorado Supreme Court case held that an injunction
should not have issued to prevent the anticipatory nuisance of a quarry, particularly where the operation
of the quarry was otherwise lawful and compatible with the area’s zoning regulations. Green v. Castle
Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973). However, this decision emphasized repeatedly that the
court was deferring to the legislative judgment of the relevant government authorities, and that factor
would weigh on the other side of the scale in a takings challenge, because the relevant legislature would
have found a limitation on fracking to be necessary under the circumstances. Still, the concept of
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Allowing fracking, a large and disruptive industrial process, in the
middle of residential or commercial zoned areas therefore would be
prohibited under background principles of nuisance in Colorado. There
is no good justification for waiting for communities to suffer harm and
then have to sue for damages, like the Parr family was forced to do in
Texas.
The Supreme Court essentially has treated the background principles
argument as an affirmative defense, placing the burden on the
government to prove that nuisance or other background principles
prohibit the property owners’ use of his property under current
circumstances. 231 Although this requirement rejects a cautionary
approach to protecting public health and welfare, governments often will
be able to make the showings required under state nuisance law. It is
not a particularly heavy lift to show that fracking, and all of its
associated processes, cause pollution, such as diesel exhaust from the
heavy trucks, hazardous chemicals released at the wellhead, or the noise
and light pollution associated with heavy industrial activity located in
residentially-zoned areas, spills, and the risk of groundwater
contamination. 232 The poor safety record of the industry 233 might
provide sufficient evidence that fracking causes an unreasonable risk of
harm to others, particularly where the fracking operations would be
located near homes, schools, or businesses, as is often the case.234
Evidence of difficulty selling property with nearby fracking operations
or of people forced to move from their home to escape the noise, light,
vibration, or pollution from fracking operations also likely would rise to
the level of a “substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the
public.” 235 While it is certainly true that oil and gas extraction has not
been considered a nuisance historically, times have changed. When
anticipatory nuisance highlights the burden that government would have to carry to show that nuisance
law would impose limits on the ability of the oil and gas industry to conduct fracking operations. For a
more detailed discussion of anticipatory nuisance, see George P. Smith, II, Re-Validating the Doctrine
of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005) (noting judicial hesitancy to restrain conduct
before its effects are known).
231. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
232. See, e.g., Wilmore v. Chain O’Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934) (property owner has
no right to pollute a stream).
233. An exhaustive accounting of the industry’s safety record is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, one of the oil and gas operators in Longmont, TOP Operating, had such a poor safety record
that it prompted citizens to band together to ban fracking in the community. Leaks at TOP Operating’s
wells and waste pits have been known since 2006. See Longmont looks at drilling suggestions,
LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, http://www.timescall.com/ci_20411471/longmont-oil-gas-drilling-suggestions
(last visited May 25, 2016).
234. Moore v. Standard Paint & Glass, 358 P.2d 33, 36 (Colo. 1960) (holding that nuisance law
applies both to conditions and activities on private property which create unreasonable risk of harm to
others).
235. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994).
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courts are presented with evidence on the full range of impacts
associated with fracking, the risk of harm, pollution, and annoyance
caused by modern industry practices stand a good chance of being
deemed a nuisance. The likelihood of finding a nuisance increases in
densely populated areas or residentially zoned areas where industrial
activity is out of place and incongruous with the neighboring land uses
such as homes and schools. Although a nuisance defense would be by
no means a slam dunk, the realities of modern fracking practices and the
severe disturbance and impacts they impose on neighbors in otherwise
tranquil areas at least make this a viable defense that could gain traction
in court.
Going beyond nuisance law, reasonable use is another background
principle that might insulate fracking regulations and bans from takings
claims in New York and Colorado. This principle applies most directly
to impacts on the surface property, unlike nuisance which focuses more
on the neighboring properties. However, because of the use of
horizontal drilling in fracking cases, which now means that the oil and
gas being extracted may lie under property far from the wellsite, a
broader application of the principle may be justified. Reasonable use is
a limitation under New York law where courts have found mineral
rights do not include the right to take unreasonable actions or actions not
necessary to the production of underlying minerals. 236 In Colorado, the
law protects surface property owners from mineral owners who use the
surface in an unreasonable manner, and the right of reasonable surface
use “does not include the right to destroy, interfere with or damage the
surface owner’s correlative rights to the surface.” 237 If the only means
for extracting the minerals requires unreasonable interference with
surface rights, then the mineral owner effectively has no right to extract
the minerals. 238 Governments have many factual arguments that large
scale fracking operations, and all of their associated activities, amount to
an unreasonable use of the surface due to their large footprint, pollution
and safety risks at the surface, and the interference with the rights of
surface owners by reducing their property value or limiting their ability
to sell their property.
Additionally, the public trust doctrine is an inherent aspect of
sovereignty, including state sovereignty, which imposes a trust
236. Miles v. Home Gas Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (disallowing right to
store gas from foreign fields on surface property); see also Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y.
538 (N.Y. 1874); Frank v. Fortuna Energy, Inc., 856 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (discussing
reasonable use for oil and gas interest).
237. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 926 (Colo. 1997); see also Notch
Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995); Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 535 (Colo.
1923).
238. Barker, 215 P. at 535.
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responsibility for certain critical natural resources on behalf of the
public, and, as such, this constitutes a background principle that can
defend against fracking-takings claims. 239 The public trust doctrine has
deep historical origins and has been recognized in U.S. law since at least
1892. 240 Initially applied to tidal or navigable waters, the public trust
doctrine has been expanded to other water resources such as wetlands
and groundwater as well as non-water resources such as parks, forests,
wildlife, and ecosystems. 241 Sovereign governments, including New
York and Colorado, have obligations to protect these public trust
resources. To the extent that fracking harms those resources, the public
trust doctrine acts as a background principle defense for any regulation
or prohibition on fracking designed to prevent that harm.
New York has taken a relatively broad approach to the public trust
doctrine, recognizing that it applies to public park land 242 as well as the
more traditional application to navigable waters. 243 The public trust
doctrine even has been discussed in a takings case in New York based
on a challenge to the Long Island Pine Barrens Protection Act, part of
the state Environmental Conservation Law. 244 The takings claim was
rejected, even though it limited development on Long Island, based on
the justification that a law designed to conserve drinking water did not
amount to a taking because it merely gave expression to the public trust
doctrine. 245 Although Colorado courts have not expressly applied the
public trust doctrine in any of their cases, 246 Colorado was admitted to
239. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 U. MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
240. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (finding that public trust
responsibilities over navigable waters and the lands beneath them prevented the state from selling
submerged lands to a private interest).
241. See Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fisheries
Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 292-93 (2007).
242. Capruso v. Vill. of Kings Point, 16 N.E.3d 527, 530 (N.Y. 2014); see also Williams v.
Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920) (prohibiting the commissioner of parks from allowing portion of
Central Park to be used for non-park purposes).
243. See, e.g., Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S. 788, 792 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994), aff’d, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998).
244. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (discussing law
designed to protect drinking water).
245. “This generation’s duty has been discharged merely by setting aside this land for their use
under the doctrine of the Public Trust.” Id. at 1012. The court created a broad application of the
background principles defense when it stated “conservation laws need no specific scientific justification
and admit no rebuttal on the basis of utility. In enacting environmental mandates (as in protecting the
right of property), we are merely discharging our obligation under the societal contract” between
generations. Id.
246. Most cases involving the public trust doctrine in Colorado revolve around attempts by voters
to require stricter adherence to the public trust doctrine through ballot measures. See, e.g., In re Title,
Ballot Title, Submission Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3, 274 P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012). In cases making
substantive claims regarding the public trust doctrine, the Colorado courts have declined to reach the

84

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

the Union “on an equal footing with the original states” and, therefore,
has the same sovereign rights and responsibilities over public trust
resources as other states. 247 While Colorado has some latitude in
defining the scope of the public trust doctrine it will apply, it cannot
completely abdicate its public trust responsibilities. 248 Thus, the public
trust doctrine must be viewed as a potential limitation on mineral
owners’ property rights in both New York and Colorado.
Finally, both the Colorado constitution and state statutes authorize
regulations that are designed to protect public health, safety, and
welfare. 249 The inalienable rights provision of the Colorado constitution
creates a background principle that affirmatively authorizes all citizens,
including when acting through their government, to protect their “right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their
safety and happiness.” 250 The owners of mineral rights do not have a
property interest in extracting their oil and gas in a manner that threatens
those inalienable rights like fracking threatens to do. Additionally, the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act requires that the state ensure
that production of oil and gas is “consistent with protection of public
health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and
wildlife resources.” 251 This state statute embodies several background
principles such as nuisance, reasonable use, inalienable rights, and the
police power of government as a valid pre-existing limitation on mineral
merits. See City of Steamboat Springs v. Johnson, 252 P.3d 1142, 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (case
involved construction of a highway on greenbelt area and claim that public trust required dedication of
additional open space to replace the lost greenbelt land); Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo.
Water Cons. Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (finding that state
agency, in complying with relevant statutory provision, had “satisfied whatever public trust
responsibilities it may have”).
247. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894).
248. See, e.g., Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 460-61 (1892).
249. Colorado courts have said remarkably little on the status of the public trust doctrine in that
state. The court has acknowledged that the public trust has been used in other contexts, but failed to
explain why it does not apply to the specific case before it. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025,
1027-28 (Colo. 1979) (basing the decision on a narrow reading of a state constitutional provision setting
up the prior appropriate system for water rights). The public trust doctrine has been criticized in a few
dissents from the Colorado Supreme Court as well. See, e.g., Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v.
Colo. Water Conserv. Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting); In re Title,
Ballot Title, Submissions Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3, 274 P.3d 562, 572-74 (Colo. 2012). Most of the
cases in Colorado discussing the public trust doctrine deal with attempts to amend the state constitution
by explicitly defining the scope of the public trust doctrine as it applies to water in Colorado, rather than
cases where the court discusses the meaning of existence of the public trust doctrine directly. Thus, it is
not correct to state that the public trust doctrine does not exist in Colorado. Rather, the courts in
Colorado simply have not applied the public trust doctrine substantively to any cases or taken any
opportunity to define its scope, particularly as it might apply to resources other than water.
250. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3.
251. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2014).
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estates such as oil and gas.
B. Defining the Scope of the Property Right for a Total Take
If courts determine that no background principles would support the
regulation being challenged, the next step in a takings analysis would be
to define the scope of the property analyzed. Based on the guidance
provided by the Supreme Court, the industry claimant would seek to
argue for a narrow scope, limited to only mineral rights or to an oil and
gas lease, perhaps. In contrast, government defendants would argue that
the full scope of property, up to a fee simple interest in land, should be
the relevant property interest based on the “parcel as a whole” rule. The
outcome would depend on the specific facts of each case, state property
law, and how willing the particular court is to find a taking.
The most defensible definition for the scope of the property right is a
fee simple estate in land. If this approach is adopted, then proving the
occurrence of a total take would be nearly impossible. The surface
likely would retain at least some value, even if oil and gas development
was prohibited. This is particularly the case in cities and towns in New
York and Colorado, where much of the proposed development would be
beneath existing uses on the surface such as homes, schools, parks, etc.
Many Supreme Court cases support this approach, based on the parcel as
a whole rule. 252 No Supreme Court case after Lucas has applied the
total take rule to anything less than a fee simple interest in land.
After a fee simple in the land as a whole, a severed mineral estate is
the property that has the most likely chance of being recognized as the
appropriate basis for takings purposes. This argument is unlikely to
succeed where the surface estate and the mineral estate both have the
same owner, 253 but may have some chance of success if the mineral
estate is owned separately from the surface. This is often the case in
many states, including New York and Colorado. However, even if the
only focus is on the mineral estate, it still will be difficult to prove that a
total take has occurred. A fracking ban would affect only oil and gas, so
any value in the mineral estate in coal, sand and gravel, or other
minerals would defeat a total takings claim.
Even if oil and gas are the only minerals that have economic value in
a particular parcel, a total take claim still faces several obstacles. First,
oil and gas previously may have been produced from the parcel using
252. Most notably, the Supreme Court rejected attempts to break apart the bundle of rights in a fee
simple interest in land, particularly with regard to air development rights, which are analogous to
mineral rights. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 125, 130 (1978).
253. See, e.g., District Intown Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (giving limited value to subdivision of property where all lots held by the same owner).
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traditional drilling and completion techniques, or perhaps fracking
itself. 254 This historical production would preclude a total take.255
Second, it may be possible to produce oil and gas without using
fracking. Even if this would result in less oil and gas being produced,
and thus less profit to industry, it nevertheless would defeat a total
takings claim. Third, even if no oil and gas could be economically
produced without using fracking, the mineral estate may still have some
remaining value. Circumstances often change in the industry. Not only
might a ban on fracking be lifted if politics change, or if the impacts of
fracking can be reduced enough to be deemed “safe” by the government,
but new technologies might come along that would allow the resource to
be produced without using fracking. 256 Thus, assertions that the value of
the mineral estate is zero without the ability to frack should be treated
with skepticism by the court. 257 Finally, the claimant must be able to
prove that he or she actually would produce the oil and gas in the
absence of a fracking ban. This must be more than a mere assertion,
particularly given the rapidly evolving technological and economic
conditions. When oil and gas prices were riding high, it would have
been much easier for takings plaintiffs to prove that they actually could
produce oil and gas at a profit. At currently low prices for both oil and
gas, these claims are much less credible. 258
254. Recent news reports have indicated at least some examples of oil and gas companies that are
currently operating producing wells in New York from a formation other than the Marcellus Shale,
which would preclude a total take finding even if only the mineral estate was examined. See Anya
Litvak, Uncommon Legal Concept May Surface in New York After Fracking Ban, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Dec. 23, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policypowersource/2014/12/23/Uncommon-legal-concept-may-surface-in-New-York-after-frackingban/stories/201412230015 (discussing how Talisman Energy has 70 wells producing from a limestone
formation below the Marcellus Shale).
255. Historical production would most clearly preclude a total take where ownership of the
property had not changed. However, it may be tempting to think that if historical production predated
the current owner’s interest in the mineral estate, then a total take might still be allowed. This reasoning
should be rejected by courts, because it would create an untenable and unfair system where a longtime
owner cannot bring a takings claim but a new owner could. This would invite mineral interest owners to
game the system by simply selling the mineral estate to a new owner in order to bring a takings claim
based on a total take categorical claim. Public liability for takings claims should not be subject to the
whims of such gamesmanship.
256. Although flawed in many ways, the Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Miller Bros. did
at least recognize the temporary nature of restrictions on oil and gas development, because the oil and
gas remains in place so that it may be extracted in the future if the ban is lifted, for example. See Miller
Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
257. The Supreme Court had recognized a reduction of over 93% as not amounting to a total take.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001). It is not difficult to imagine that someone
might be willing to purchase mineral rights at 7% of their value in order to have the option of producing
if the law changes to allow fracking, or the technology allows production without fracking.
258. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 29 tbl.2 (Mar. 10,
2015) (projecting average price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil to be $52.15 for 2015, compared
to $93.26 in 2014, for a decline of 44 percent). Of course, oil and gas prices may well go up again in the
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Colorado law on takings of mineral interests, like federal law, is
mixed. The Colorado courts have not addressed takings in the oil and
gas context, but they have for other mineral interests such as sand and
gravel or coal. In a sand and gravel takings case, the Colorado Supreme
Court affirmed the “parcel as a whole” rule, holding that “the
appropriate focus of a takings inquiry is the property rights as an
aggregate rather than merely the mineral rights.” 259 The court explicitly
discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Penn Central and
Keystone which rejected attempts to conceptually sever the airspace
development rights and the support estate in coal respectively. 260 Thus
Colorado has rejected the severed estate approach suggested by states
such as Ohio. 261 A regulatory taking might still be found when
analyzing the effect of fracking regulations on the parcel as a whole, but
not a Lucas total. 262
Coal takings cases in Colorado should not be read to support
choosing the oil and gas estate or the mineral estate as the denominator
for the total takings test. First, any Colorado cases finding a taking of
coal interests are over half a century old, 263 much less recent than the
Animas Valley Sand & Gravel decision in 2001 which squarely ruled on
this question. Second, the only coal takings case which came after
Lucas was decided actually found no unconstitutional taking, whether
total or otherwise. 264 While coal takings cases are interesting because
future. But they may also go down. Reliance on “economics” as a factor in the takings analysis is
called into question by the oil and gas example, due to the wild fluctuations in a market driven largely
by speculation. But even assuming that reliance on economics is good policy, the economics of fracking
in many areas are not good currently. The weekly rig count in the United States has been dropping
precipitously in recent months, indicating declining interest in drilling new oil and gas wells. See, e.g.,
Angela Chen, U.S. Rig Count Falls to 922 in Latest Week, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:33 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-rig-count-falls-to-922-in-latest-week-1425666810 (noting the thirteenth
straight week of declines, with the number of all oil and gas rigs at 1,192, down from 1,792 a year ago).
Additionally, industry reports indicate that many wells which have been drilled have not been
completed, i.e. fracked, because it would not be profitable to do so with oil and gas prices so low. Dan
Murtaugh & Lynn Dolan, Introducing Fracklog, the New-Fangled Oil Storage System: Energy, WASH.
POST/BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 6, 2015, 2:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0306/introducing-fracklog-the-new-fangled-oil-storage-system-energy (citing Continental Resources CEO
as saying 85% of wells are not being completed currently). Additionally, the breakeven price for many
areas is near or even above current prices. FACTBOX-Breakeven Oil Prices for U.S. Shale: Analyst
Estimates, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014) (noting many areas where the breakeven price for oil is above the
current oil price of around $50/bbl; estimates for the Niobrara, which includes the areas in the Colorado
case study, range from $46.10-$72.75).
259. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. La Plata County, 38 P.3d 59, 68 (Colo. 2001).
260. Id.
261. See State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59, 67
(Ohio 2007).
262. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, 38 P.3d at 65 (noting that a regulatory taking might be proven
under a fact-specific inquiry even if a total take was not established).
263. See, e.g., William E. Russell Coal Co. v. Boulder Cty., 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954).
264. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 181-82 (Colo. 1993) (noting that severance of
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they also involve mineral interests, they are also readily distinguishable,
because any cases that found a taking have relied on a permanent
requirement to leave coal in place in order to support the surface, which
is different from regulations or prohibitions on fracking based on the
adverse public health, safety, and environmental impacts associated with
that particular technology. 265
One final policy issue is relevant regarding the scope of the property
for fracking-takings in Colorado based on the current legal disputes over
fracking bans. In order for a taking to be found based on a fracking ban,
Colorado courts (specifically the Colorado Supreme Court) first would
have to find that local bans on fracking are not preempted by state law.
Only then would a takings claim even arise. 266 Yet a decision which
does not involve preemption of local regulations would lay the
groundwork for a finding of no unconstitutional taking. A finding of no
preemption likely would be based on one of two findings: (1) fracking
is a matter of local concern, because the impacts fracking has on the
local community outweighs any state interest in promoting oil and gas
development; or (2) regulation including a ban on fracking is consistent
with the state interest which in turn requires oil and gas development to
be consistent with protection of public health and the environment.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine the Colorado Supreme Court finding an
unconstitutional taking had occurred after first ruling that state law does
not preempt a ban. Essentially, a local fracking ban likely only survives
if the courts recognize that fracking creates a nuisance in local
communities. Thus, the prospect for takings claims in Colorado is
particularly dim, given the context of its bans and the nature of state
preemption law.
So what is the takeaway then regarding the scope of the property
right? In large part this is unknown, particularly in New York and
Colorado, as the issue has not yet been squarely presented. However,
for basically every plausible fact pattern, it would be difficult, if not
the mineral estate included a duty to support the surface and rejecting a physical occupation claim based
on a “single, transitory physical invasion” through drilling of a test well). The court further rejected a
claim that information from the test well which showed that coal mining on the subject property was not
commercially feasible. Id. at 184.
265. The effect of the more permanent requirements for coal to support the surface estate are
discussed more fully at infra Part IV.D.
266. There is a possibility of a “temporary takings” claim based on the time between when a ban
was enacted and when it might be invalidated as preempted. However, such a claim is unlikely, as for
the most part industry has not demonstrated that it would actually be fracking in the particular
jurisdictions with bans currently. In fact, in Longmont the principal operator has agreed not to bring any
takings claims until after the preemption issue is decided. Complaint of Intervenor TOP Operating
Company ¶ 15, June 21, 2013, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, (Boulder
Cty. Colo.) (“TOP has agreed not to assert, either directly or indirectly (through another party), any
takings claim or claim for damages against Longmont in this action.”).
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impossible, to prove that a total take had occurred. First, a finding of a
total take would require a very narrow interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent that would focus on a narrowly defined mineral estate.
Second, the claimant would have to prove at least the following facts:
(1) no oil and gas had been produced previously from that mineral
estate; (2) no oil and gas could be produced in the future without the use
of fracking; (3) oil and gas could be produced, under current economic
and technical conditions, using fracking; and (4) the remaining value of
the mineral estate, with a fracking ban in place, was zero. This
appropriately has been described as an uphill battle and one that is
unlikely to succeed.
C. Regulation of Fracking under the Penn Central Factors
The most likely test to be applied in a fracking-takings case—
assuming no background principle defense was shown—would be the
familiar Penn Central balancing test. As this is a highly fact-specific
test and the ultimate outcome of any weighing by courts is largely
indeterminate, this Article will not attempt to predict with any certainty
how cases would come out under this test. However, a few general
observations again indicate the difficulty that a claimant would face
under this approach.
The character of the government action likely would weigh strongly
against finding a taking. A prohibition on fracking does not physically
invade any private property. Rather, it is aimed at securing the common
good by preventing the externalities associated with extracting oil and
gas through the use of fracking. This factor recognizes that the
government has a role in protecting the public health. In the face of any
uncertainty about whether fracking is consistent with the protection of
public health and welfare, courts should be extremely hesitant to
overrule the decisions of legislative bodies. Where those legislative
bodies have concluded that the public should not have to bear even the
uncertainty of risks, it is appropriate for courts to defer to this
conclusion unless it can be shown by a fracking-takings claimant that
the government’s action is clearly erroneous.
In New York, the state has gone to extraordinary lengths to document
the uncertainty surrounding fracking and whether it can be done safely.
Because fracking poses a serious risk to the common good, the character
of the government action strongly supports a finding of no taking. In
contrast to the nuisance background principle defense, here the
government need not prove fracking constitutes a nuisance, but rather
that a prohibition on fracking is necessary to support the common

90

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

good. 267 Because the harms of fracking are concentrated greatly on the
areas in the immediate vicinity of fracking operations, and the benefits
often flow to distant oil and gas companies, the market cannot be relied
upon to reduce these externalities and, thus, government regulation is
necessary and appropriate.
In Colorado, where fracking bans or regulations are relatively limited
in geographic scope and focused on relatively dense urban and suburban
areas, the character of the government action would support regulation
to reduce or limit those harms. The local laws in Colorado should be
seen as valid exercises of zoning authority 268 or as necessary actions by
government to protect the inalienable rights of all citizens to protect
their lives, liberty, safety, and their own property rights. 269 Thus, the
character of the government action, designed at protecting broad public
interests and preventing harm, should weigh heavily against a taking in
most, if not all, fracking-takings cases.
The economic impact of the regulation largely would depend upon
the resolution of the denominator problem, discussed more fully in the
previous section. This factor could range from minimal impact to a very
significant impact, depending on the unique facts and circumstances of
each case. However, where the diminution in value is less than 100%,
even very large impacts of regulations have been found not to amount to
an unconstitutional taking under the Penn Central factors. 270 Thus, even
if this factor supports finding an unconstitutional taking, it is far from
conclusive.
The final factor, interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations, also would be highly fact-specific, thus making
conclusions difficult to draw from this analysis. However, one issue for
claimants to overcome would be the likelihood that the profits made
from fracking largely would be a windfall, particularly if they have held
ownership of the mineral interests for more than a decade or so. Before
the development of modern fracking techniques along with horizontal
drilling, the resources being extracted today were seen as “not
recoverable” and of limited to no value. For most oil and gas
companies, mineral interest owners, or royalty owners, these
267. The Penn Central balancing factors are only reached if the government could not prove that
the regulation merely prevented activity which would be deemed a public nuisance. Thus, the character
of government action may still support a finding of no taking even if the government cannot prove that
fracking would be a nuisance. Courts have been repeatedly instructed to look at the totality of
circumstances under the Penn Central test, including specifically the public purposes served by the
regulation in question. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 633-34 (2001).
268. Particularly if local regulations or bans are not preempted under state law.
269. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3.
270. See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31 (finding that $200,000 remaining value out of a total
value of $3,150,000, for a take of over 93%).
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developments were not due to their own investments. Rather, these
changes converted previously worthless mineral interests into ones that
could make tremendous windfall profits if companies and owners are
allowed to frack wherever they please. Absent a showing that a
fracking-takings plaintiff has reasonably invested significant amounts of
capital in the expectation it could utilize fracking, this factor is unlikely
to support a takings claim.
D. Temporary Restrictions on Fracking: The Case of Moratoria
If an outright ban on fracking found in New York state or some local
jurisdictions in Colorado is unlikely to be found to constitute an
unconstitutional taking, then a moratorium on fracking designed to give
government officials a chance to catch up to the rapid pace of change in
the oil and gas industry is even less likely to be found a taking. All of
the same reasons why a ban would not be a taking apply in this
situation—already a very difficult hill for fracking-takings plaintiffs to
climb. Additional arguments against temporary takings will make
takings claims based on moratoria nearly impossible.
A good example of a moratorium is the one enacted through a ballot
measure by the citizens of Fort Collins, Colorado. Concerned that their
city council was not responding to the will of the voters, a group of
community members organized to place a five year moratorium on the
ballot, and this moratorium was approved at the ballot box in November
2013. 271 The stated purpose of the moratorium was to “protect property,
property values, public health, safety and welfare” while providing time
for the city “to study the impacts of the process [of fracking] on the
citizens of the City of Fort Collins.” 272 This express purpose fits well
with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for rejecting a taking in the TahoeSierra case, because the additional time allows city regulators to study
the impacts and devise an appropriate regulatory response, thus
“facilitating informed decisionmaking” by the city. 273
Although the length of the moratorium in Fort Collins is longer than
the moratorium at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, there is no bright line rule for
when a moratorium lasts too long. Instead, courts must ask whether the
moratorium amounts to an “extraordinary delay in governmental

271. See City of Fort Collins, Special Election held in conjunction with the Larimer County
General Election (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.fcgov.com/cityclerk/elections2013nov.php (the
moratorium was adopted with 57% in favor).
272. Proposed Citizen Ordinance, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.fcgov.com/cityclerk/ballotlangfull2013nov.php.
273. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 339 (2002).
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decisionmaking.” 274 In the case of Fort Collins, there is a strong
argument from the city that the delay was reasonable under the
circumstances and necessary based on pending studies, the results of
which were expected to become available during the course of the
moratorium. Specifically, the ballot measure through which the
moratorium was adopted explicitly refers to a health impact assessment
expected to be conducted by the State of Colorado. 275 Additionally,
proponents of the moratorium cited to additional studies to explain why
they chose a five year moratorium period. 276 These facts should be
more than sufficient to preclude a takings claim based on this five year
moratorium, especially since courts have declined to find an
unconstitutional taking based on even longer delays of up to seven to
eight years. 277
E. Valuation of Any Takings Found
Even assuming that a takings could be proven, and no affirmative
defense is available, the tricky question of valuation remains. Frackingtakings present several difficult questions with no simple answers.
Unlike a fee simple interest in land, which has a reasonably clear market
value, mineral interests are highly speculative. Often the value of the
interest is not known until the oil and gas actually is produced and sold.
Additionally, because the value in mineral interests is not in owning or
using them, but, rather, in producing and selling the resource, the
property interest is in many ways more akin to personal property than to
real property. Yet the minerals are not actually taken—they remain
under ground to be potentially produced at some time in the future.
Finally, the oil and gas industry is a notoriously boom and bust industry,
not just because of the quick declines in production, but also due to large
and unpredictable swings in the market price for the resource. As a
result of all of these factors, court valuation of fracking-takings claims is
tremendously difficult.
One thing can be said with relative confidence, however: the
valuation of a takings claim should not be based on lost profits, despite
the industry’s common assertion. 278 Even the one questionable decision
274. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
275. Proposed Citizen Ordinance, supra note 272.
276. Aff. of Elizabeth Giddens, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Fort Collins, No 2013CV31385
(Larimer Cty. Colo.) (citing studies by the National Science Foundation and Environmental Protection
Agency as well as the state, expected to be released between 2016 and 2019).
277. See, e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 472
U.S. 172 (1985) (delay of eight years); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (delay of
seven years).
278. See, e.g., TOP Operating Company’s Amended Response to Citizen Intervenors’ Motion for

2016]

FRACKING/TAKINGS

93

which found a taking in the oil and gas context did not agree that this
valuation was appropriate. 279 The production of oil and gas is a risky
business. Sometimes wells do not produce oil and gas or do not produce
the quantities expected. It is not uncommon for operators to lose money
on individual wells. Paying the value of the presumed resource or for
speculative “lost profits” would take all of the risk away and create a
windfall for the claimant at the expense of the public.
Another reason to avoid paying for the value of the resource or for
lost profits is that the government is not actually taking the oil and gas.
Governments have not condemned mineral rights or oil and gas interests
and, therefore, unless the court finds a permanent taking occurred and
transfers the taken property interest to the government, the owner still
retains the right to extract the minerals if the regulations change to allow
fracking or if a new technique comes along that allows production
without fracking. Oil and gas prices might also go up so much in the
future that alternate means to produce oil and gas, which are not
economical under today’s standards, could allow mineral rights owners
to extract value from their resource even if existing regulations and bans
remain in place.
The dramatic swings in the price of oil and gas raise an additional
issue. Even if fracking could be proven to be the only means of
producing oil and gas from a particular mineral estate, delays in
producing the resource actually might work to the advantage of the
mineral interest owner. This would be relevant for any “temporary
takings” claims that might occur, particularly as the price of oil and gas
have dropped dramatically in recent months. If the price rebounds in the
future, it may be that the restrictions on fracking either had no economic
impact or could lead to increased profits for claimants who weren’t
producing during periods of low prices. If the price declines for an
extended period of time, then many fracking-takings plaintiffs may not
even be able to show that their mineral interests have any value.
These considerations call into question whether recognition of a
taking is even appropriate. Let us imagine a hypothetical world where
the price of oil drops to $20/bbl and remains there for an extended
period of time. This price for oil would preclude most if not all
potential takings claims related to fracking bans or regulations. Yet if
Stay Pending Appeal at 3, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty.,
filed Oct. 2, 2014) (arguing based on an apparent back of the envelope calculation that it could make
over $215M by drilling 13 wells in Longmont immediately, and therefore that a bond of nearly $20M
should be posted to stay judgment while an appeal could be pursued) The court rejected this argument,
and set a bond of $100, which was 0.0005% of the requested $20M. Order: Reply in Support of Stay
Pending Appeal, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Oct. 14,
2014).
279. Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
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the price ten years from now increases to $150/bbl, perhaps due to
disruptions in supply in unstable regions like the Middle East or Nigeria,
could a takings claim be brought at that time? Why should the
determination of an unconstitutional taking be so dependent on issues
utterly outside the control of state or local governments? Might
governments then have an incentive to restrict fracking when the price
of oil and gas is low in order to protect against the harms of fracking on
their communities, yet if the price of oil and gas rises, they should then
decide that protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community
is not worth potentially crippling takings judgments against them? 280 Or
instead does takings law provide the same incentives to governments to
game the system as it would to mineral interest owners? Should
governments—now that they know new resources are recoverable but
only in ways that greatly upset their communities—initiate eminent
domain proceedings to formally take mineral interests when the prices
are low, because they cannot be extracted economically at that time?
Surely the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not intended to
create such perverse incentives.
A simple example, based on realistic numbers for the price of oil and
the cost of producing it, is helpful to understand the dramatic change
that can occur in very short timeframes. Let us assume that an oil and
gas development project has the potential to produce 200,000 barrels of
oil (gas excluded for simplicity). Assume further that the cost to
produce that oil amounts to $45/bbl, 281 or $9,000,000. Let us assume
the price for oil goes from $95/bbl to $50/bbl. 282 Assuming all the oil
was produced in a year, a company could invest $9 million to make a
$10 million profit at $95/bbl, but would only make $1 million profit on
the investment of $9 million at $50/bbl. Thus, a potential takings claim
based on the value of lost profits could vary by an order of magnitude if
a fracking-takings case was filed in 2014 instead of 2015. Thus, any
just compensation awards that are based on estimated value of the oil
and gas are highly arbitrary.
No court has yet announced a consistent and justifiable system for
putting a valuation on a takings claim in the oil and gas context. In the
only case to actually find a taking, the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court on the valuation issue. 283 The court held that
280. For a critique of putting a dollar value on human life and health, see generally Liza
Heinzerling & Frack Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002).
281. See supra note 258, explaining that breakeven costs for the Niobrara shale, which includes
the Wattenberg field beneath Longmont, Colorado, range from $46.10-$72.75.
282. See id., discussing how EIA predicts oil prices to average barely above $50/bbl in 2015, after
averaging over $90/bbl in 2014.
283. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d at 221.
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an award of $71,479,000—determined to be the fair market value of the
property found to be taken—should not have been equated with the just
compensation that was owed. 284 After walking through some of the
difficulties in determining the market value in this type of case, 285 the
court instead proposed that just compensation should be based instead
on the “fair market rental value.” 286 The court found that the rental
value, rather than the cash value of the entire mineral interest at that
time, was the appropriate measure, because the plaintiffs were not
“permanently” deprived of the use of their property, but instead that
their use was “indefinitely delayed.” 287 However, even the fair market
rental value approach has serious, insurmountable flaws.
First, there is no actual market for rental of the right to extract
resources that cannot be extracted. 288 Who would rent the right to
extract oil and gas that he or was prohibited from extracting? The court
focused too much on what the owner would want to be paid in order to
delay development, rather than what a prospective renter would pay for
the right to do nothing. The better way to approach this issue would be
to attempt to determine how much someone would pay to acquire
speculative mineral interests in the hope of sometime being able to
extract the minerals in the future due to changes in law, technology, or
economics. However, this is another way of saying that some value
remains in the mineral estate, despite the impact of the regulation being
challenged and, thus, no taking should be found in the first place.
The second problem with the fair market rental value approach is that
it is based on the admittedly problematic determination of the “pretaking
cash value of the plaintiff’s property.” 289 Although converting the
market value to a rental value by applying market interest rates does
reduce the taking award, it does not address the underlying difficulties in
calculating the market value. For instance, how are changes in the price
of oil and gas to be accounted for? If the prices go up, shouldn’t the
property owner be entitled to more compensation? If the prices go
down, shouldn’t the government have to pay less? Why should the
284. Id. at 220-21.
285. The court noted that “it is impossible to know whether there is oil and gas under the
protected area without drilling wells” but found it persuasive that the plaintiffs “almost certainly would
have discovered some oil and gas had they been allowed to drill in the protected area.” Id. at 222.
Whether the plaintiffs had proven they would “almost certainly” produce enough oil and gas to justify at
$70 million award against the government was not discussed.
286. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
287. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d at 222-23. This distinction was intended to prevent either the
public from being enriched at the expense of the property owner, or the property owner from being
enriched at the expense of the public. Id. at 223.
288. Even the Miller Bros. court recognized that “there is almost certainly no true rental market to
look to for guidance.” Id. at 223.
289. Id. at 222.
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prices used in the determination of the value be set at one particular
time, the time when a takings claim ultimately was decided? This
would open takings law to significant manipulation, and plaintiffs would
attempt to time their fracking-takings claims with periods of high oil and
gas prices. However, if the court attempts to correct this by requiring
repeated reevaluations, this would create large bureaucratic processes or
expensive and continued court oversight. Creating a fair system for
ongoing determination of a fair market rental value would be, I suggest,
unworkable and impractical.
One final point is that fracking-takings are distinguishable from the
closest available analogy of regulatory takings of coal by requirements
for supporting the surface. Leaving coal in place to support the surface
is far more permanent than simply prohibiting fracking, which is the
currently preferred completion method in the oil and gas industry.
While surface uses might change or new technology might be developed
to allow for future extraction of the coal without causing surface
subsidence, it is much more plausible to assume that the coal must
always remain in order to support the surface. In stark contrast, it is
much easier to imagine a future where developments in technology or
our understanding of the impacts of fracking mean that restrictions on
fracking to protect public health, safety, or welfare may be lifted. Or
new completion techniques might be developed that would allow the oil
and gas at issue to be produced without fracking. Or the price of oil and
gas might go so high that even if relatively less amounts of oil and gas
could be produced without fracking, production would nevertheless be
economical. Thus, courts should resist calls to simply analogize to the
very different circumstances that surround regulatory takings of coal
required to support the surface.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite common claims by many oil and gas companies, regulation
of fracking likely would not amount to a taking except in limited
circumstances. Many fracking-takings claims would be defensible as
restrictions based on background principles of law such as nuisance,
particularly those cases where industry seeks to operate in densely
populated areas near homes and schools. Even if background principles
do not preclude a taking, oil and gas companies or royalty owners would
have a difficult time proving a total take under the parcel as a whole
rule. Thus, most fracking-takings would be analyzed under the Penn
Central factors, where again, the purpose of regulations or prohibitions
designed to prevent harm to neighbors and the public likely would
preclude a taking. Temporary restrictions on fracking such as moratoria
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are even less likely to be deemed a taking under existing caselaw.
Finally, even if a taking could be proven, the numerous issues in putting
a value on speculative amounts of oil and gas that might be extracted in
the future create serious policy reasons that further argue against a
taking. Thus, absent unusual circumstances, most courts should reject
fracking-takings claims and allow state and local laws regarding
fracking to remain in force without requiring potentially crippling “just
compensation” awards, which, in effect, give governments the ability to
respond to the public demand that public health, safety, and welfare be
protected, even it requires the oil and gas industry not to have free reign
to frack as it pleases.

